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I. THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM
The topic for this symposiuml is procedural change and the
respective roles of Congress and of the judiciary in making the
rules that govern civil justice. The immediate focus is the last
decade of innovations, from the 1980s when a group sponsored
by Senator Joseph Biden published a pamphlet Justice for All:
Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation,2 through the en-
1. Civil Justice Reform Act Implementation Conference, Mar. 20-22, 1997
(program on file with the Alabama Law Review).
2. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 135 1997-1998
1997] Changing Practices, Changing Rules 135
actment in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), to its
study by RAND over the past few years, to 1997-the year in
which Congress considers whether to renew the Civil Justice
Reform Act.3 The central questions are: What is the shape of
the litigation system in the United States in the late 19908?
How-if at all-does it look different than it did before Congress
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990?
My response requires an understanding not only of the last
decade but also the last half century, the years since 1938 when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective.4 My pur-
poses are several: to map the respective roles of the federal
judiciary and of Congress in governing civil processes; to under-
stand the relationships between national and local rule regimes;
to examine the changes over these decades in the practices of
judging, and to learn more about the interactions of judges and
lawyers during the course of civil litigation. Below I rely on two
examples (changes related to the size of the civil jury and those
related to the role of the judge during the pretrial process) from
which to learn about how practices change, about the rela-
tionship between practices and rule regimes (be they local or
national), and about the respective roles of the federal judiciary
AND DELAY IN CML LITIGATION (BROOKINGS, 1989).
3. As enacted in 1990, the CJRA had provisions for terminating certain pro-
grams and for evaluating and reporting on implementation. Pilot and demonstration
programs were to run for a "4-year period." CJRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 105 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)). Those deadlines were ex-
tended, first to 1996 and then to December of 1997. See Judicial Amendments Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420 § 4; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-317 § 608(b). The Judicial Conference of the United States was required to
report initially in 1995, and then the reporting time was extended, first until 1996
and then until June 30th of 1997. See CJRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104;
Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4; Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 608(a). In May of 1977, the Judicial Con-
ference filed its final report on implementation of this act. See THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CML JUSTICE REFORM A~ OF 1990: FINAL
REPORT ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY, AsSESS-
MENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES (May 1997) [hereinafter 1997 JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT] (submitted as required by the legislation as the
third report to Congress).
4. See Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937). The rules became effective
on September 16, 1938, after their submission to Congress. See Jack B. Weinstein,
After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice
Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (1989) (discussing the rules in a symposium
on their fiftieth anniversary).
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and Congress in altering both practice and rules.
As the discussion below details, the history of these past
decades is one of growing judicial discretion over civil process, of
judicial care to guard its own discretionary authority, of ongoing
variation between national and local rules and between rules
and practice, and of declining discussion by trial judges of their
roles as adjudicators. Thus far, the judiciary has generally suc-
ceeded in convincing Congress that expansive judicial discretion
over civil case processing is appropriate. Despite evident discord
between Congress and the federal judiciary about the enactment
of the CJRA, the congressionally-enacted CJRA and the judicial-
ly-promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure closely resemble
each other.
Thus, while a good deal of commentary has located civil
justice reform as a contested arena, I disagree about the locus of
tension, but not about the fact of conflict. Contemporary battles
between the federal courts and Congress are less about civil
process and more about the structure and authority of the judi-
ciary itself. Over the past decades, the federal judiciary has
shored up its dominion over case processing and its role as case
managers and settlers, but neither through doctrine nor through
commentary have judges articulated a robust commitment to
federal adjudicatory authority nor have they developed a litera-
ture or a practice supporting their special license and expansive
authority.
II. A FIRST EXAMPLE: THE SIZE OF THE CIVIL JURY
My mandate for this symposium (to write about the role of
the federal judiciary vis-a-vis Congress and how and when rules
and practices change) was much on my mind when I participat-
ed in another conference, held in the winter of 1996 in New
York City and co-sponsored by the New York University School
of Law and the Federal Judicial Center. Assembled were about
45 federal judges from the Eastern seaboard; the topic was the
jury system in the United States.5 After my segment of the pro-
5. See Improving Jury Selection and Jury Comprehension, A Workshop Co-
sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center and the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion of New York University School of Law, Dec. 11-13, 1996 (materials on file with
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gram was over, I listened as a federal appellate judge, Patrick
Higginbotham, gave an impassioned defense of the twelve-per-
son civil jury. Judge Higginbotham, who sits on the Fifth Cir-
cuit, had chaired the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the
mid-1990s during its work that resulted in a proposed amend-
ment (ultimately unsuccessful) of Federal Rule 48 to reinstate
the requirement of a twelve-person civil jury.6
A The Practice ofa Six Person Jury, and
Subsequently, a Revised Rule
To understand the exchange in 1996 among federal judges
about the size of a civil jury, a bit of background is needed about
how the size of the civil jury changed, from twelve to six. Insofar
as I am aware, advocacy for a jury smaller than twelve began in
the 1950s and became more insistent in the 1960s.7 Advocates
author) [hereinafter NYUIFJC Jury Conference].
6. As amended in 1991, FED. R. Crv. P. 48 currently states that: "The court
shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not more than twelve members ...." In
1995, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules had proposed language to state: "The
court shall seat a jury of twelve members . . . ." Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 163
F.R.D. 91, 147 (transmitted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States for Notice and Comment, September
1995) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. According to the memorandum from Judge
Higginbotham in support of that change, the Advisory Committee "unanimously rec-
ommend[ed] a return to 12-person juries ...•" [d. at 135. As he explained, the pur-
pose was to ensure that a civil jury would commence "with 12 persons, in the ab-
sence of a stipulation by counsel of a lesser number, but could lose down to 6 as
excused by the trial judge for illness, etc." [d. at 136.
7. See, e.g., Roy L. Herndon, The Jury Trial in the Twentieth Century, 32
LAB. BULL. 35 (Dec. 1956) [hereinafter Herndon, Jury Trial]; Six-Member Juries
Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 136 (1958) [here-
inafter Six Member Juries]; Edward A Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J. 120 (1962) [hereinafter Tamm, Five-Man
Civil Jury]; Edward A Tamm, A Proposal for Five-Member Civil Juries in the Feder-
al Courts, 50 ABA J. 162 (Feb. 1964) [hereinafter Proposal].
The first federal legislation that I have been able to locate that makes possi-
ble a smaller than twelve person jury was introduced on Feb. 19, 1953, by Repre-
sentative Abraham Multer, a Democrat from New York. See H.R. 3308, Bad Cong,
Feb. 19, 1953 (to permit that "[i]n each civil action tried by a jury, other than those
tried by a jury as a matter of right guaranteed by the seventh amendment of the
Constitution, the number of jurors which constitute a jury and the number of jurors
who must agree [for a valid verdict] shall be determined by the law of the State jn
which such civil action is tried"). No hearings appear to have been held nor have I
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suggested that shrinking the number of jurors would "relieve
congestion," encourage "prompt trials and lower costs," with no
effects on outcome.s Some of the vocal proponents were federal
and state trial judges, who asserted not only their own experi-
ences9 but also those of state systems that had used smaller
juries in certain kinds of cases.IO A fair inference from the ad-
found commentary on what sparked this proposal.
In 1958, an Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Temporary
Commission on the Courts reported to the New York State Governor and Legislature
about proposed procedural revisions. Included was a provision that a "party demand-
ing jury trial . . . shall specify in his demand whether he demands trial by a jury
composed of six or of twelve persons. Where a party has not specified the number of
jurors, he shall be deemed to have demanded a trial by a jury composed of six per-
sons." Thereafter, opposing parties would also have had the option of demanding a
jury of twelve. Title 41.4 at 223-224, 1958 Report of the Temporary Commission on
the Courts, 13 [N.Y.] Legislative Document (Feb. 15, 1958). According to the Notes,
the Municipal Court of New York had that practice and it "worked well." Further,
New York courts had had six person juries in New York "justice of the peace" courts
since the state's inception in the eighteenth century. Appended was a list of the size
of the juries in the then forty-eight states. [d. at 579-97 (reporting that "[m]ost
departures from the twelve-man jury practice occur in courts of limited jurisdiction").
In 1972, the New York Legislature changed its statute to provide for a reduc-
tion in jurors from twelve to six. See NY CPLR § 4104 (McKinnneys, 1996) ("A jury
shall be composed of six persons"). That change accorded with recommendations from
the Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, arguing that, "by speeding up the selection of
juries," trials would also be "speeded up." Governor's Memorandum, N.Y. State Legis.
Annual, ch. 185; 1972 Laws of N.Y. at 322.
8. Six-Member Juries, supra note 7, at 136.
9. For example, United States District Court Judge Tamm referred to his expe-
rience with the District of Columbia's code of five person juries in condemnation
cases and argued that five provided the "perfect balance in affording the litigants all
of the benefits of a jury trial, while eliminating unnecessary delay, expense and
inefficiency." Tamm, Five-Man Civil Jury supra note 7, at 138.
10. See, e.g., id. at 134-35 (citing a 1956 speech by a California judge that "at
least 36 states have constitutional and statutory provisions for juries of less than 12
in one or another of their courts," albeit often in only certain kinds of cases).
For a description of state court experiences, see Hon. Richard H. Phillips, A
Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956) (discussing lower court use of six
person juries in courts other than the superior court); Philip M. Cronin, Six-Member
Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J., Apr. 1958, at 27 (reporting on the "success"
of the 1957 "experiment" of six person juries in Worcester Superior Court). According
to Professor Hans Zeisel, while some of the states permitted smaller juries for cases
involving small claims, at least Utah permitted eight person juries in noncapital
cases in general jurisdiction courts. Hans Zeisel, ... And Then There Were None:
The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971) [hereinafter
Zeisel, And Then There Were None]. Judge Devitt reported that in addition to Utah,
Florida and Virginia also provided for less than twelve person juries in courts of
general jurisdiction. See Edward J. Devitt, The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court,
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vocacy in favor of making this change is that, although the Fed-
eral Rule permitted a jury of less than twelve upon stipulation,
such stipulations were rare;l1 in the 1960s, the twelve person
civil jury was the norm in federal COurt.12 In 1970, the United
States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Florida,13 which
held that Florida's six person criminal jury was constitutionally
permissible. That case was decided on June 22, 1970.14 At the
time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 provided that juries of
less than twelve could occur only by party stipulation.15 Never-
theless, within four months, federal district courts began to
change their local rules. By 1972, 54 local district court rules
provided for six person juries.16 During that time, the Judicial
53 F.R.D. 273, 278 n.6 (Address at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference, June 30,
1971).
11. See Tamm, Five-Man Civil Jury, supra note 7, at 140 (noting that no one
had ever so stipulated in his experience as a judge).
12. I have found no direct empirical evidence on the number of jurors who sat,
but the arguments for change all seem to be addressed to a uniform tradition of
twelve jurors. For example, according to Judge Tamm, at least one state (Connecti-
cut) that provided for the option of six had not then succeeded in installing six
person juries except in courts of limited jurisdiction and that, to "change" the num-
ber of jurors, a constitutional and legislative mandate was needed. Id. (quoting Phil-
lips, supra note 10, at 355-56). See also Gordon Bermant and Rob Coppock, Out-
comes of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Trials: An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the
State of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1973) (reporting on the "growing" sup-
port for a jury smaller than 12). Further, in 1956, when describing smaller juries,
Judge Hemdon commented that only the "increasing numbers of heretics have had
the boldness to argue that the number twelve is not sacred ...•" (emphasis in the
original). Hemdon, Jury Trial, supra note 7, at 47.
13. 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970) (concluding that a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were not violated by a Florida rule permitting a six person jury).
14. Id.
15. As promulgated in the 1930s, Rule 48, entitled "Juries of Less than
Twelve-Majority Verdict," provided that the "parties may stipulate that the jury
shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a
stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury."
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 102 (ABA, William W. Dawson,
ed., 1938) [hereinafter 1938 Rules].
16. According to Chief Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit (who also
supported the return in 1995 to a twelve person jury), within the first year after
Williams, 29 federal district courts had, by local rule, "moved to six person juries."
See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve
in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 25 (1993) [hereinafter Arnold, Jury of
Twelve]. See also Devitt, supra note 10, at 277 ("The trend toward six-man juries in
civil cases in the Federal Courts is growing rapidly."). For the details of which dis-
tricts made the change, see H. Richmond Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the
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Conference of the United States passed a resolution in favor of a
six person civil jury and asked Congress to enact such a rule.l7
In 1973, the Supreme Court reviewed one of those local
federal district court rules that permitted a six person jury in
civil cases.lS The Supreme Court (5-4) held that neither the
Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, nor the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure required that twelve people sit on a
Common Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 535-42 ("List of U.S. District
Courts that Have Adopted Rules Reducing the Size of Civil Juries," beginning in
November of 1970 and ending in September of 1972).
Chief Justice Warren Burger's enthusiasm for the smaller jury played a role,
but the chronology of changes is somewhat difficult to reconstruct. According to
Hans Zeisel, seventeen of these districts changed their rules under the sponsorship
of the Chief Justice. See Zeisel, And Then There Were None, supra note 10, at 710.
In contrast, the Chief Justice points to districts that had changed their rules as sup-
port for his position that such alterations were worth further investigation. See War-
ren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1971, 57 ABA J. 855, 858
(1971) (address given July, 1971, and published Sept. 1971). In that address, and
despite the existence of FEn. R. CN. P. 48 that then provided for deviations from
twelve only upon party stipulation, the Chief Judge mentioned the state practice of
smaller juries, that a "dozen federal districts have followed the examples of some of
those states" and reduced the size of civil juries, and that he had "urged the recent-
ly appointed Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure to look closely at the experience
of courts" using smaller juries. [d. Paul Carrington recalls the Chief Justice asked in
a (perhaps unpublished) speech why juries should be twelve and that soon thereaf-
ter, the local rules began to appear. Telephone Conversation with Paul Carrington of
Duke University (Feb. 24, 1997).
Support for smaller juries also came from a study, conducted under the aus-
pices of the Institute for Judicial Administration of NYU, which gathered data by
surveying lawyers, judges, and court clerks in New Jersey's state courts. See INSTI-
TUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIX- AND TwELVE-MEMBER
CIVIL JURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS (1972) (concluding that
smaller juries saved money and that differences in outcomes "appear to be due to
differences in the types of cases selected by lawyers to be tried to six- and twelve-
member juries rather than to differences in the size of the jury").
17. Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 25. See Report of the Proceedings
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, held at Washington, D.C. March 15-
16, 1971 at 5-6 (according to Judge Irving Kaufman, then Chair of the Committee
on the Operation of the Jury System, by that time, five or six districts had adopted
local rules changing the size). The Conference Resolution stated that it "approve[d]
in principle a reduction in the size of juries in civil trials in the United States dis-
trict courts," and that the means to "effectuate" the change was by rulemaking or by
statute. [d. In October of the same year, the Conference reaffirmed its resolution.
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, held in
Washington, D.C. Oct, 28-29, 1971, at 41.
18. The rule came from the federal district court of Montana. Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (citing Local Rule, U.S. District Court, Montana
13(d)(1)).
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federal civil jury; thus, the local variation was neither unconsti-
tutional nor unlawful.19 Note that, by the time the Supreme
Court considered and upheld the federal six person civil jury,
more than half the districts had rules providing for six person
juries in at least some of their civil cases.20
Despite the federal judiciary's enthusiasm for six person
juries, the Judicial Conference met with skepticism when it
pressed Congress for legislation to change the size of civil ju-
ries.21 After a series of unsuccessful efforts to obtain congressio-
19. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160, 162-163. Justice Brennan wrote for the five per-
son majority; Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Powell, argued in dissent that the
local rule was flatly inconsistent with the federal rules. Id. at 165. Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Stewart, dissented on constitutional grounds as well as on statuto-
ry and rule grounds. Id. at 166-88. The decision has been much criticized. See, e.g.,
Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflecticns, 1990 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 33, 51 (noting that Geoffrey Hazard had called the decision "monu-
mentally unconvincing" and adding that "[t]o some, it may not be even that persua-
sive") [hereinafter, Carrington, The Seventh Amendment].
20. As the Court so noted. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 150 n.1.
21. Representative William Lloyd Scott, a Republican member of Congress,
introduced H.R. 7800, 92d Congo (1971), to provide that "[a] petit jury in civil and
criminal cases in a district court of the United States shall consist of six jurors"
except in capital cases. In 1973, after he had become a Senator, Scott introduced an
identical bilI in the Senate. See S. 288, 93d Congo (1973).
In 1972, Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York and then Chair of the
Judiciary Committee of the House, introduced H.R. 13496, 92d Congo (1972), to pro-
vide for six person juries in civil cases "unless the parties stipulate to a lesser num-
ber." In 1973, Peter Rodino, the new chair of the Judiciary Committee and a Demo-
crat from New Jersey introduced H.R. 8285, 93d Congo (1973), which was identical
to the Celler bilI of the year before. A companion bill (S. 2057, which slightly varied
from the House version) was before the Senate. In 1977, Representative Rodino
introduced a bilI again, identical in its effort to alter the jury size but also including
requirements of unanimity absent stipulations by the parties. See H.R. 7813, 95th
Congo (1977).
Testifying in 1973 on behalf of the legislation were federal judges, including
Judge Devitt, Judge Arthur Stanley, Jr. in his capacity as Chair of the Judicial
Conference on the Operation of the Jury System, and an official from the Justice
Department. See Three Judge Court and Six Person Civil Jury: Hearings on S. 271
and H.R. 8285 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administra-
tion of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Congo [hereinafter Hearings on a
Six Person Jury].
Judges Devitt and Stanley argued for the reduction in size on the grounds of
its utility, economy, and for the statute on the grounds of the need for "uniformity"
of practice. Id. at 17, 19, 30, 36. James McCafferty of the Administrative Office
provided data on juror utilization and cost savings. Id. at 25-26. The Justice Depart-
ment argued that the reduction in size would save money, increase speed, and di-
minish the burden of service on juries. Id. at 92-96. The ABA took no position at
that point. Id. at 104 (statement of Edmund D. Campbell).
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nal blessings, in 1978 the "Judicial Conference agreed to stop
seeking legislation on the subject."22 By that time (1978), 85 of
Opponents included the ACLU, the NAACP, and Professor Hans Zeisel. Argu-
ments advanced against the change included that juries would have fewer members
of minority communities (id. at 127, Testimony of Charles Morgan for the ACLU; id.
at 142, Testimony of Nathaniel Jones for the NAACP; id. at 161, testimony of Hans
Zeisel); that jury service is an important part of American life that should be en-
couraged and widely distributed (id.); that civil juries were vital parts of the justice
system (id. at 133-34); and that the claims of size not affecting outcome were erro-
neous (id. at 157-162).
The question of the size of the civil jury was debated thereafter by the ABA.
In 1974, an ABA committee initially recommended "support[ing] the enactment of
legislation which would revise the number of jurors in civil trials in federal courts to
six persons," but when that proposal encountered opposition, withdrew that recom-
mendation. See Proceedings of the 1974 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates
and Report No. 1 of the Special Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improve-
ments, ABA ANN. REp., vol. 99, at 182, 305 (1978).
In 1983, the ABA promulgated its first set of Standards Relating to Juror Use
and Management; in that volume, ABA Standard 17(b) stated that civil juries should
"consist of no fewer than six and no more than twelve." See ABA STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT, at 150 (1983) [hereinafter ABA STAN-
DARDS]. See also Standard 17(b) at 156 (ABA, 1993).
At the midyear meeting in 1990, the ABA House of Delegates approved by
voice vote a resolution from the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice that the
ABA supports "legislative efforts to restore the size of a federal civil jury to 12 per-
sons and to enable 10 of the 12 to render a verdict in a civil trial." (resolution on
me with author). The ABA House of Delegates endorsed that resolution in 1991.
1993 ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 161.
22. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 21-22, 1978, at 78 (Judge C. Clyde Atkins, then
Chair of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, reported that, because
local rules provided for juries of six in 85 of the federal districts, no further legisla-
tion should be sought). See also Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 27. Be-
tween 1971 and 1978, the Conference considered the size of the jury several times.
In 1972, it approved the then-pending H.R. 13496, "drafted" in furtherance of the
Conference's resolution in support of a smaller jury. Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, held in Washington, D.C., Apr. 6-7, 1972,
at 4-5. In 1973, 1974, and 1977, the Conference reiterated its support for smaller ju-
ries. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
held in Washington, D.C., Apr. 5-6, 1973, at 13; Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 19-20,
1974, at 56; Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 15-16, 1977, at 83-84.
As among the different proposals, the Conference expressed its preference for
one bill (S. 2057) that provided for unanimity absent stipulation and for alterations
in peremptory challenges over another bill (H.R. 8285) that did not have those fea-
tures; the Conference also stated its view that juries should be reduced in size in
civil but not in criminal cases. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 13-14, 1973, at 54-55.
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the districts had their own rules permitting fewer than twelve
jurors.23
Not until more than a decade later, however, did the nation-
al rule reflect this change. Moving forward to the late 1980s,
Professor Paul Carrington (then the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee) proposed revisiting Rule 48 initially in the hopes of
returning to the twelve person jury. But, upon finding little
support in the Advisory Committee for that position, Professor
Carrington thought it appropriate to revise the text to reflect the
practice of empaneling smaller juries.24 Thereafter, the Adviso-
ry Committee proposed a rule change to authorize judicial selec-
tion of a smaller civil jury; the comment explained that the older
rule was rendered "obsolete,"25 an inventive euphemism to cap-
ture the point that the national rule was disobeyed at the local
level. Hence, in 1991, about twenty years after the change in
practice, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended Federal
Rule 48 to state that a court "shall seat a jury of not fewer than
six and not more than twelve."26 Today, federal civil juries
across the United States routinely consist of fewer than twelve
persons.27 I provide an overview of the evolution of this rule
23. See supra note 22, and Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 27-28. By
1989, four more districts had enacted such local rules, 50 that eighty-eight districts
authorized smaller juries. Telephone Conversation with David Williams, Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 28, 1997).
In terms of the size of juries in states, see J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the
Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HAsTINGS L.J. 1433, 1490-
91 (1996) (describing eight states that have juries of less than twelve in certain
kinds of felony cases and, in contrast, "fewer than fifteen" states that have civil
juries of twelve "without exception"; also reporting a recommendation to reduce jury
size in certain criminal cases in California).
24. Telephone Conversation with Paul Carrington of Duke Law School (Feb. 24,
1997). See also Carrington, The Seventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 52-53 (be-
cause the then-text of Rule 48 "is rendered meaningless . . • it is now necessary to
revise the rule, lest it mislead parties and counsel in light of the reality established
by the local rules").
25. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 127 F.R.D. 237, 357
(1989), FED R. Cw. P. 48 advisory committee's notes.
26. FED. R. Cw. P. 48; see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
134 F.R.D. 525, 545 (1991).
27. Once again, statements in rules and the actual practice diverge. Many local
rules speak of six person juries. Yet case law from litigants seeking reversals on the
grounds that the wrong number of jurors deliberated demonstrates that, regardless
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of mandates of six or twelve, some district judges sent more than six jurors and
fewer than twelve to deliberate. For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded in one case
that, if a judge "convert[s]" alternate jurors to "regular voting jurors before" dis-
charging the jury to deliberate, the acceptance of a verdict from the larger jury
(there, a jury of eight) was not reversible error, absent a party's objections at the
time. Rideau v. Parkem Indus. Servs., Inc., 917 F.2d 892, 895 (5th Cir. 1990). The
Fourth Circuit developed a rule that no more than six jurors could retire to deliber-
ate (see Kuykendall v. Southern Ry., 652 F.2d 391, 392 (4th Cir. 1981), while the
Sixth Circuit concluded that permitting a larger number to deliberate did not consti-
tute reversible error. Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Hanson v. Arrowsmith, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). See also E.E.O.C. v.
Delaware Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1420-21 (3d Cir. 1989)
(noting that a seven person jury, comprised of six jurors plus one alternate delib-
erating, was not a "problem" when parties did not object); UNR Industries, Inc. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 1434, 1446-47 (N.D. m. 1988) (rejecting a chal-
lenge to an eight person jury consisting of six jurors and two alternates».
Such anecdotal evidence can only be supplemented in part. According to John
K. Rabiej of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, when the Adviso-
ry Committee was considering the proposed change, it sought to obtain comprehen-
sive data but learned that such information could not be collected nationwide from
the current data base. Telephone Conversation with John K. Rabiej, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 17, 1997). Thereafter, David Williams of the
Administrative Office did a survey for the Committee; he reviewed monthly juror
utilization forms returned periodically from different districts. See Monthly Petit
Juror Usage, JS 11, Rev. 10/90 (on file with author). When filled out by the dis-
tricts, some but not all of these forms distinguish between civil and criminal juries.
Some note use of alternatives, but many do not. The form does not request infor-
mation on the number of jurors sitting at the time of verdict. Within these con-
straints, Mr. Williams concluded that, in 1994, eight person civil juries were utilized
most frequently in the federal courts, followed by seven, twelve, and nine person
juries, and relatively infrequently, six person juries. Interview of Alys Brehio with
David Williams, Administrative Office of United States Courts (Feb. 28, 1997).
Given the practice of varying numbers of jurors, the Advisory Committee ar-
gued that its proposal was less transformative than would be a leap from six to
twelve jurors: "[t]hroughout the United States today the district courts are seating 8
and 10 person juries for any other than the most routine civil matters." Proposed
Rules, supra note 6, at 136. At the NYUIFJC Jury Conference, supra note 5, many
district judges also commented that they rarely used six person juries and that the
debate was not fairly cast as six versus twelve but more accurately should be under-
stood as nine versus twelve.
For a local rule detailing a district judge's options on the number of jurors,
see the current rule in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Local Civil Rule 48.01 (1997) (providing that civil cases may be submitted
to either a jury of six or twelve, "at the discretion of the presiding Judge. However,
if the parties agree to waive a six (6) person jury with one or more alternate jurors
and proceed to trial with an eight (8) person jury with no alternate jurors, the
Court may allow them to do so." Further, if any of the eight leave, the court may
take a verdict as long as at least six remain).
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From this background, move forward once again to Decem-
ber of 1996, and consider the exchange between Judge
Higginbotham. and the federal district court judges. With the
skill of a well-practiced trial lawyer, Judge Higginbotham. made
an impassioned plea for the twelve person jury. For him, trial
courts were the "heart" of the federal judiciary, and jury trials
one of the most important activities of the trial court.28 He ar-
gued that a return to twelve persons helped the quality of delib-
erations and the consistency of verdicts.29 He pointed out that a
twelve person jury also enhanced the opportunity for a diverse
group of citizens to participate in and be educated by the ju-
ry-all of which, in his view, improved the fairness and the
legitimacy of the jury and outweighed what he considered to be
the negligible savings in cost and time achieved by a smaller
jury.3D
But despite my appreciation for the skills of the advocate,
28. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, Oral Presentation, at NYUIFJC Jury Con-
ference, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Memorandum from Patrick E. Higginbotham to Members of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, re Six-Person versus Twelve-Person Juries (Oct.
12, 1994) (on file with author).
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most of his audience of 45 district trial judges were unmoved.31
Rather, these federal trial judges insisted on how normal a jury
of six to nine people was; more were rarely needed. Many trial
judges reported positive experiences with smaller juries and
believed them to be "economical and expeditious."32 Moreover,
these district judges bridled at the prospect of a mandatory
twelve person jury; they decidedly preferred the flexibility and
discretion that inhered in the current rule. Judge Higginbotham
did succeed in one respect. In conversation afterwards with a
few relatively new trial judges, I learned that, prior to Judge
Higginbotham's speech, they had not realized that they had the
discretion to have a jury "as large as twelve;" some reported they
might well "try" a jury of twelve.
Thus, within twenty-five years, a rule and practice had
changed so completely that a generation of "new" judges as-
sumed it ordinary to have juries of less than twelve and thought
it odd for someone to insist that twelve was a number not only
to be preferred but to be mandated. The district judges' views
were sufficiently powerful within the Judicial Conference33 to
cause that body to reject a proposal by the Standing Committee
on Civil Rules to return to the twelve person jury.34 The ava-
lanche of protest from federal district judges-a kind of rebellion
against their own judicial rulemakers-resulted in the refusal to
transmit a proposed rule change.35
31. Judge John Keenan, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, was assigned the task of presenting the arguments on behalf
of a smaller jury and representing the district judges' views. NYUIFJC Jury Confer-
ence, supra note 5.
32. Rule 48, Prepublication Comments, materials provided to the NYU/FJC Jury
Conference, supra note 5, at 21 (on file with author).
33. Bruce D. Brown, Judges Kill Plan to Require 12 on Jury, LEGAL TIMEs,
Sept. 30, 1996 at 12 (a spokesperson for the judiciary cited district court opposition
to the proposal); Henry J. Reske, The Verdict of Most States and the Judicial Con-
ference is . . . Smaller Juries are More Efficient, 82 A.BA J. 24 (Dec. 1996).
34. In June of 1996, the Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure of the United States Judicial Conference voted, 9-2, in favor of the proposed
amendment to Rule 48. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States at 70 (Sept. 17, 1996).
35. See Brown, supra note 33, at 12 (describing comments about district court
opposition). See also materials provided for the NYUIFJC Jury Conference, supra
note 5, at Tab "Jury Size and Unanimity" including excerpt from Report of the Judi-
cial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Agenda F-18, Rules
Sept. 1996 (including prepublication comments on proposed amendments to Rule 48,
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The civil jury practices provide a first occasion from which
to look at the processes ofruIe change. Note the trajectory: First,
the practice relating to the size of civil juries changed at the
local level, initially coming from' state court practice and then
moving to federal district civil practice. Thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court countenanced-indeed, endorsed-both
the state and federal practices and found them permissible un-
der federal constitutional and statutory law.36
Second, local federal ruIe changes both predated the nation-
al rule and were at variance with the governing federal ruIe.37
Third, the national ruIe-RuIe 48-followed long after the prac-
tice and codified what was already deeply in place. National
many of them negative and from district court judges and noting that the Judicial
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management opposed the
amendment, in letters written on December 21, 1994, and March 20, 1996, and pro-
vided to the Judicial Conference).
36. As noted earlier, national signals of support were forthcoming from Chief
Justice Burger and the Judicial Conference. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text. Further, the Court's case law also provided enthusiastic support for a smaller
jury-explained in part by its effort to cushion the impact of the application of the
Sixth Amendment to the states.
For example, in Williams v. Florida, the Court (per Justice White) argued
against "codifying" a twelve-person jury as a constitutional requirement by claiming
that it was a "feature so incidental" to the Sixth Amendment that only ascribing "a
blind formalism to the Framers" could support its constitutional imposition. 399 U.S.
78, 103 (1970). Justice White cited Justice Harlan's earlier dissent, in Duncan v.
Louisiana, in which Harlan-arguing against incorporation of the obligation of a jury
trial on the states-noted that the federal rule of twelve is not fundamental, but
rather that the number was "wholly without significance 'except to mystics.''' Wil-
liams, 399 U.S. at 102, quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, in tum in Williams, protested that, because of the
incorporation doctrine he had argued against in Duncan, the Court would permit
"diluting constitutional protections within the federal system" including a twelve
person criminal jury. Williams, 399 U.S. at 117-119 (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
37. Here the dissenters in Colgrove clearly have it right that the local rules and
the national rule did not "mesh." Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 165 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The national rule stated that parties could "stipulate" to juries of less
than twelve whereas the local rule at issue mandated juries of six. In short, the
local rules violated the national rule. Paul Carrington has observed that, given the
ruling in Colgrove, the "sky seemed to be the limit" on local deviation from national
rules. Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts,
45 DUKE L.J., 929, 951 (1996) [hereinafter Carrington, Disunionism).
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rulemaking was not the beginning of change, but the announce-
ment of a change that had already occurred. While at the formal
level, the change was complete within about twenty years (mea-
sured from the time of introduction in the early 1970s to the
enactment of the national federal rule in 1991), local practice
had been revised more rapidly.
Fourth, and related to the roots of the change at the local
level, the revision had great support from trial judges, who pro-
moted the concept of a smaller jury, persuaded the bar, and then
implemented the change. For example, when proponent Edward
Devitt (then Chief Judge of the federal district court in Minneso-
ta) described his local rule on six person juries, he explained
how the change was negotiated by the bench with the bar. In his
words, "[i]n the interest of securing the cooperation of the mem-
bers of the Bar in accepting the Rule graciously and assisting in
making its purposes effective," the change had initially a limited
application.38
Fifth, the change enhanced the discretion of trial judges,
who in this instance took authority away from litigants (or more
accurately, their lawyers) to decide on the number of jurors.39
As judges at the 1996 NYUIFJC Jury Conference explained, they
have varied practices on the number of jurors routinely empan-
eled. Few reported selecting only six, and more said that they
38. Devitt, supra note 10, at 274-75 ("the Rule was made applicable only to
those cases where jurisdiction was also obtainable in the state courts. Hence it was
limited to Diversity, FEU, and Jones Act cases with the thought that if the Rule
in its limited form was effective and withstood challenge, if any, it later would be
extended to federal jurisdiction cases as well"). According to Judge Devitt, the State
of Minnesota adopted a rule providing for six person juries after Williams v. Florida
was decided in 1970. See Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 31; see
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.01 (June 8, 1971). The prior rule had defined a jury to be a
"body of 12 men or women, or both" but was replaced with the definition of a "body
of six persons." Historical Note to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.01 (1988). In 1988, the
Minnesota Constitution was amended; it now states that "[t]he legislature may pro-
vide for the number of jurors in a civil action or proceeding, provided that a jury
have at least six members." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. Thereafter, the Minnesota
statute was repealed by 1990 MINN. LAws 1990, ch. 553, § 15 (Rule 48 of the Min-
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure continues to provide that "parties may stipulate that
the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve ....").
39. We lack definitive empiricism to tell us how that discretion is exercised in
practice, how many juries of what kinds are populated by what number of jurors,
both at the time of commencement of a trial and at its completion. See supra note
27 and accompanying text.
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often picked eight or nine jurors. An obvious utility of using
more than six is permitting attrition without a mistrial.40 Trial
judges liked this flexibility and objected strongly to a mandated
number of jurors, and, more specifically, twelve. As Professors
Stephen Subrin and Stephen Burbank have taught US,41 a basic
feature of the twentieth century ru1e reform in the United
States has been the growth of judicial discretion; specifically,
discretionary practices more commonly associated with equity
were imported by the federal ru1es into law and have become
routine across the federal docket. Here we see an example of
that increase in judicial discretion.42
40. The system of empaneling alternate jurors on the civil side changed when
judges gained the flexibility of determining the number of jurors. In 1989, when
proposing to authorize smaller juries, the Advisory Committee proposed the elimina-
tion of the practice of empaneling alternative jurors. See Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate and Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, supra note 25, at 355-357. At the time, Rule 47 had provided that judges
could empanel no more than six additional jurors who would sit and then, prior to
deliberations, be excused if not needed. Id. The Advisory Committee noted "dissat-
isfaction" with the "burden . • . on alternates who are required to listen to the evi-
dence but denied the satisfaction of participating in its evaluation." Id. at 356. Fur-
ther, if judges attempted to include the alternates, they risked reversal. Some cir-
cuits held that, absent parties' consent on the record, judges who permitted alternate
jurors to deliberate commit reversal error. See, e.g., Cabral v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 998
(1st Cir. 1992) (ordering a new trial when a district judge permitted four alternates
to deliberate with six jurors). See also supra note 27.
The 1995 proposals to return the jury to the larger size were not accompanied
by a return to alternates; rather, proposed Rule 48 provided that the court seat
twelve jurors, that all participate "unless excused," that absent party stipulation,
verdicts be unanimous, and that no verdict be taken from fewer than six jurors.
Proposed Rules, supra note 6, at 147. The alternate juror system remains on the
criminal side. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c). Data remain unavailable nationwide on
the number of jurors empaneled as contrasted with those sitting at verdict. Further,
to my knowledge, no research has been done on whether the willingness to excuse
jurors has been altered since the rule changes. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
41. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987)
[hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered]; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules En-
abling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance
and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841
(1993) [hereinafter Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform].
42. The rejection of a proposed lawyer voir dire of jurors is consistent with this
aspect of the tr~ectory of judicial control rather than of lawyerllitigant control. See
Proposed Rules, supra note 26, at 129, 145 (Advisory Committee recommendation
that Rule 47, on the selection of jurors, be modified so that, after a judge-conducted
voir dire, the "court shall also permit the parties to orally examine the prospective
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The sixth point is about the role of Congress, which stayed
away from making changes. Presumably, the popular base of
juries43 made it politically unpopular to press for legislation
cutting their size. Some members of Congress evidently also
thought it unwise.44 This example of the size of the civil jury
provides no evidence of Congress as adventurously championing
efforts to alter civil practice in a dramatic fashion. Rather, Con-
gress appears to have been a conservative spectator.45
jurors to supplement the court's examination within reasonable limits of time, man-
ner, and subject matter, as the court determines in its discretion."). While an FJC
study determined that, in practice, about sixty percent of the federal judiciary per-
mits such lawyer involvement, judges opposed mandating that practice. See Marcia
Coyle, Rules Would Expand Voir Dire, Civil Jury Size, 18 NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 1996,
at A12. The opposition resulted in the withdrawal of the proposed amendment and
instead on educational efforts to encourage judges to permit attorney voir dire. See
Draft; Minutes of the Civil Rules Committee, Apr. 18-19, 1996, at 5 (on file with
author).
43. While criticism of the jury is longstanding, so is support for it. See, e.g.,
THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, FINAL REpORT OF THE ANNuAL CmEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, June 24-25 (Roscoe
Pound Foundation, 1977); VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYsTEM (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
44. Judge Arnold mentioned "congressional misgivings" in discussing the absence
of legislation to decrease jury size. Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 27.
Specifically, both Representatives Kastenmeier and Drinan expressed skepticism
about the wisdom of the reduction. During the questioning, Representative
Kastenmeier asked about opposition to the change stemming from litigants concerned
about the "quality of justice," and about whether a change in the civil jury was a
"foot in the door for the reduction in size of criminal juries." Hearings on a Six
Person Jury, supra note 21, at 29, 32. Representative Drinan stated that, given the
5-4 decision in Colgrove, he did not believe that the matter was "settled." Id. at 30.
Furthermore, in his view, federal judges had exceeded their authority by local
rulemaking beyond the parameters of Rule 48 and the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at
36. Drinan also raised the possibility of some kind of "compromise" in which certain
kinds of cases, such as those involving civil rights, would be exempt from the small-
er jury provisions. Id. at 139.
45. When testifying in opposition to the then-pending legislation, Professor Zeisel
called upon the committee to make "the 12-man jury obligatory in Federal courts."
Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 163. Kastenmeier demurred, ex-
plaining that he had not received reports of injustice. In an exchange with Represen-
tative Drinan, Professor Zeisel discussed the politics, that in his view, the Colgrove
case was one in which the defendant insurance company wanted the larger jury, and
that, plaintiffs' lawyers "almost by a political decision" had not complained. Given
his view that a smaller jury was a more erratic jury, he thought that plaintiffs'
attorneys might well have a preference for it. Id. at 164.
It is not clear whether views of the size of the jury during the 1970s corre-
sponded to one's position in the bar as a "defense" or "plaintiff' attorney. According
to the lower court opinion in Colgrove, both plaintiff and defendant protested District
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Seventh, the grounds for change were economy and efficien-
cy: speed and ease. More than two decades ago, proponents ar-
gued on behalf of a "six man" jury in words familiar today. As
Judge Devitt put it, the change would "improve[] efficiency at
less cost without sacrifice of legal rights."46 Hans Zeisel, a crit-
ic, put it more bluntly: that the two arguments in favor of a
reduction in size were "save money and ... save time."47
Eighth, once the change was made, the new approach be-
came hard to revise, even when its underpinnings were ques-
tioned from several directions; for many, the change was a "ter-
rible blunder."48 One ground for objection to the central premise
of the 1970s Supreme Court rulings is familiar. Made then and
now is the argument that courts err when they conclude that
twelve versus six jurors makes no difference in the outcome;
social scientists instruct us that jury size matters.49 A second
Judge Battin's decision to empanel a six person jury; the plaintiff filed the manda-
mus action and was then joined by the defendant. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d
1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
46. Devitt, supra note 10, at 273 (speaking at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Con-
ference in June of 1971). See also Tamm, Five-Man Civil Jury, supra note 7, at 141
("Modem conditions, i.e., ever increasing congestion and delay in the federal courts,
mounting costs-monetary and social-of the jury system necessitate its serious re-
form in the interest of efficiency and economy if the jury system is to survive.").
47. Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 167. His response was
that the "time argument is absolutely wrong and the money argument is quite
clear." [d.
48. Conversation with John Frank, Feb. 24, 1997. See generally Arnold, Jury of
Twelve, supra note 16, at 32-35. See also the debates within the ABA, supra note
21.
49. Hans Zeisel, supra note 10, at 715-24, was one of the first to attempt to
correct the Supreme Court's interpretation of social science data. See also ROBERT J.
MACCOUN, GETl'ING INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TOWARD A BETl'ER UNDERSTANDING OF
CML JURY BEHAVIOR (ICJ, Dec. 1987); Michael J. Saka, The Smaller the Jury, the
Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263 (1996).
Professor Shari Diamond of the American Bar Foundation and the University
of illinois pointed out to me that the "frequency and magnitude of differences due to
size are likely to be modest-although certainly important." Given the small number
of cases that individual judges see tried to verdict, trial judges are unlikely to at-
tribute surprising verdicts to size; "it is only be a systematic study of multiple cases
(or a large scale simulation) that we can detect real and important, although not
huge effects." Hence, judges may be comfortable accepting "the apparent efficiencies"
(ranging from selection time to reduced interruptions due to personal needs of indi-
vidual jurors) associated with smaller juries and not perceive them "as purchased at
the price of less dependable jury verdicts." Letter from Shari Diamond to Judith
Resnik (May 15, 1997) (on file with author).
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 152 1997-1998
152 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 49:1:133
argument is new and it is about the effect of size on the diversi-
ty of members within a jury. As Judge Higginbotham and others
have explained, between 1970 and 1990, aspirations for partici-
pation on the jury changed. Juries shrunk. in size as the jury
pool was opened by Supreme Court doctrine5o to include a wid-
er range of individuals and as the Court revised its doctrine on
peremptory challenges to ban those based in race and gender.51
Noting with poignancy this temporal sequence, Judge
Higginbotham argued that, given contemporary concerns about
inclusivity, whatever the accuracy of the 1970s costlbenefit anal-
ysis, it should be recalculated to reflect current views on the
importance of diversity on the jury.52 But these substantive,
specific arguments against the six person jury were trumped by
two general positions: that trial court discretion was the desir-
able means to achieve the desired goal of judicial economy.
III. A SECOND ILLUSTRATION: THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
Turn now from the change in the size of a civil jury, a
change that is discrete, specific, and small in terms of the scope
of its application53 compared with that of the CJRA,54 legisla-
50. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). See generally Nancy Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremp-
tory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1041 (1995).
51. See also Proposed Rules, supra note 6.
52. [d. (arguing that a "12 person jury . . . works an exponential increase in its
ability to reflect the interests of minorities. . . . Reducing the size from 12 to 6
plainly deals a heavier blow to the representativeness of the civil jury than any
bigoted exercise of preemptory challenges."). Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss note
that, "as the jury's composition became more democratic, its role in American civil
life declined." Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Crimi-
nal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 867, 868 (1994).
53. The change in the number of jurors affects a small fraction of all federal
litigation; over the past decades, civil jury trials in the federal courts represent
under 10 percent of the annual dispositions. For example, in 1971, when the number
of jurors was being reduced in federal courts by local rulemaking, a trial was com-
menced in 7950 of the civil cases, of which 3,347 were jury trials and 4,603 were
non-jury trials; in contrast, the federal courts disposed of 85,638 cases; thus 9.3 per-
cent of the civil caseload reached trial. 1971 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DmECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-4 at 280.
In 1995, a trial was commenced in 7,443 of the civil cases (4,126 of which
were jury trials and 3,317 were non-jury trials). The district courts disposed of a
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tion that some describe as aimed at "reform" of the entire civil
justice process and its rulemaking procedures.55 Congress has
targeted cost and delay as problems to be solved, commissioned
local Advisory Groups in each district to develop plans as the
means of reform, offered guidance in the form of principles on
differential case management, discovery control, and use of al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR)/s and asked the Institute
for Civil Justice (ICJ) of RAND to assess the impact of its ef-
forts. RAND's ICJ considered a series of variables (time to dispo-
sition, litigation costs, attorney satisfaction and views of fair-
ness67) and then measured those variables in twenty federal
total of 229,325 cases; thus 3.2 percent reached trial. See 1995 ANNuAL REpORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table
C-4 at 162.
Note that the actual number of civil trials over the time period remained
fairly stable; given increases in the size of the judiciary, the number of trials per
judge went down. Hence, each judge selects fewer juries and the number of such
selections per year is small; the economies achieved by having to select fewer jurors
at the front end thus become minimal.
A different argument about economies is not the time for selection, but the
savings achieved from having fewer jurors with which to deal. While the absolute
numbers of trials have remained roughly constant, their length has increased. Data
are no longer available that distinguish the length of jury and non-jury trials. Inter-
view with staff at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (June 11,
1997). In 1971, of 10,093 trials completed, 8,860 (about 88 percent) were three days
or under and 160 (under 2 percent) were longer than 10 days. Table C-8, 1971 AN-
NUAL REPORT at 311. In 1995, of the 10,395 trials commenced, the 7,706 trials (74
percent) were three days or under and 401 (almost 4 percent) were longer than 10
days. 1995 ANNuAL REPORT at Table C-8, 177.
One other comment is appropriate about judicial perceptions of jury selection
as a burden. Criminal trials remain, absent party stipulation, trials of twelve in the
federal courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). In terms of numbers and percentages, the
volume of criminal trials is proportionally higher than civil trials. In 1971, of 44,615
criminal defendants, at least 6,416 (about 14 percent) were tried. 1971 ANNuAL RE-
PORT, Table D-4 at 340. In 1995, of 54,980 criminal defendants, at least 4,765 (about
9 percent) were tried. 1995 ANNuAL REpORT, Table D-4 at 225.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (1990).
55. In 1988, Congress had made some adjustments in the rulemaking model of
the Rules Enabling Act but the basic structure had remained intact. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-77, and the Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Confer-
ence Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,752 et seq.
(Apr. 5, 1989).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-473. For discussion of the initial efforts and empirical
evaluation of Advisory Groups, see Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local
Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 879
(1993) [hereinafter Robel, Local Advisory Groups].
57. See James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth, Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey,
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 154 1997-1998
154 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 49:1:133
districts58 by comparing data from cases terminated in 1991
and from cases filed in 1992-93.59 The researchers concluded
that the "CJRA pilot program, as the package was implemented,
had little effect" on any of the variables studied.GO RAND's re-
port tells us that "implementation often fell short;"61 "in prac-
tice, there was much less change in case management after
CJRA than one might have expected from reading the plans."62
Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace, & Mary E. Vaiana, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPEN-
SIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CML JUSTICE
REFORM ACYr 5 (1996) [hereinafter RAND's EvALUATION OF THE CJRA]. At the same
time, RAND published three other volumes, all by the same authors, reporting its
research: AN EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACYr [hereinafter RAND's EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT]; AN
EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EvALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL Jus-
TICE REFORM ACYr [hereinafter RAND's EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND ENE], and
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACYr IN PILoT AND COMPARISON DIS-
TRICTS [hereinafter RAND's IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CJRA]. For additional informa-
tion in the research plan used, see Terence Dunworth & James S. KakaIik, Prelimi-
nary Observations on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the CilJil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1303 (1994).
58. For the list of districts, see RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note
57, at 3; the twenty represented about one third of federal caseload filings.
59. Id. at 8. For summaries of the CJRA plans, see DAVID RAUMA & DONNA
STIENSTRA, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACYr ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUr:YrION PLANS:
A SOURCEBOOK (1995).
60. RAND's EvALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 87. See also RAND's
EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 15 (discussing the
absence of empirical data prior to this study of the effects of such management). A
study of the implementation of the CJRA in one district, that of the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, focused on the use of differential case management (DCM). See LAW-
RENCE A. SALIBRA II, GERI SMITH, CHRISTOPHER MALUMPHY, A STUDY OF THE
DIFFERENTED CASE MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTED PURsUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACYr OF 1990 IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICYr COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICYr
OF Omo (Feb. 1996) (conducted by the Advisory Committee of that district) [herein-
after NORTHERN DISTRICYr OF Omo DCM STUDY] (on file with author). The study
concluded that DCM was fully implemented and had some effects on the ways in
which attorneys allocated their time and on the kinds of activities in which they
engaged, but that the "DCM system, along with the ADR protocol, did not appear to
be associated with faster case resolution" nor did these procedures have great impact
on lawyer time. Id. at 20. The authors term their findings "consistent" with those of
RAND and conclude that, in general, litigation is not unduly costly nor is discovery
inappropriately conducted. Id. at 19, 21-22.
61. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 10.
62. Id. at 15. Another report on the CJRA comes from the Federal Judicial
Center, which considered the work of five "demonstration districts" (Northern District
of California, Western District of Michigan, Western District of Missouri, Northern
District of Ohio, and Northern District of West Virginia), designated specifically by
the act. See DONNA STIENSTRA, MOLLY JOHNSON, & PATRICIA LoMBARD, REpORT OF
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RAND argues that one reason for a lack of change was Congress'
top-down effort to impose rules on a group of people-federal
judges-who are themselves specially tied to their self-percep-
tion as independent actors.63
I do not disagree with the idea that federal judges are par-
ticularly invested in their own independence. I do think, howev-
er, that the reports on the CJRA need to be recast and therefore
the results reinterpreted. The problem is not with RAND's able
and thoughtful work.54 The problems are with RAND's mandate
and its metric; the researchers were charged with looking for the
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MAN-
AGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIvE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM A~ OF 1990 (FJC, Jan. 27, 1997) (on file with author)
[hereinafter, FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REpORT]. These districts were designat-
ed because of particular judges' interest in and support of ADR, and they were thus
"willing participants" in using differential case tracking and ADR. [d. at ii-iii. The
FJC's data are based on interviews with court personnel and advisory group mem-
bers and from questionnaires answered by attorneys and some who conducted the
ADR; no litigant surveys were undertaken nor were there independent measures of
costs other than attorneys' perceptions of the effects of procedural changes on costs.
This FJC report echoes, in some respects, RAND's findings. One focus was on
differential case tracking and management. The FJC reports that management ef-
forts sometimes reduce the time to disposition. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS RE-
PORT at 7 (reporting that in only one of three case management districts studied did
statistics "show a clear lowering of disposition time during the demonstration peri-
od"). Further, the cause of such decrease may be attributed to a variety of factors,
including the reporting obligations in the CJRA itself. [d. More than half the attor-
neys surveyed in three districts reported that case management regimes had no
effects on costs (id. at 9, Table 3), and about two-thirds reported that they [the
attorneys] were "satisfied with the cost of litigation" in their case. [d. at 8. Like
RAND, the FJC reports intangible benefits, such as a change in "climate" and like
RAND, the FJC report describes attorney appreciation for contact with the bench.
[d. at 9-10.
The other focus of FJC's DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT was on ADR. In
one of the districts studied-the Western District of Missouri-attorneys reported
that ADR decreased their litigation costs. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT at
18. The FJC made estimates of costs savings, but stated that its conclusions could
only be tentative pending measurement of actual costs and comparison data. [d.
Similarly, many attorneys reported that ADR was the cause of settlement. [d. at 19.
Because some ADR proponents and providers have been distressed with
RAND's finding of no direct data to support ADR's utility in saving cost and time
(see discussion infra, at notes 185, 199-201 and accompanying text), some of them
have invoked the FJC report and stressed its findings. See, e.g., Elizabeth Plapinger,
Twilight of eJR Means Unsure Future for ADR, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 22, 1997, at B25.
63. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 7.
64. My thanks to Jim Kakalik, Terry Dunworth and their colleagues, their work
enables this commentary and others.
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 156 1997-1998
156 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 49:1:133
effects of the 1990 legislation, and to do so, they understandably
relied on assessing the differences in case processing before and
after 1990.65 But the CJRA is not the beginning of a change. Its
enactment marks the fact of changes long underway in the civil
process. Searching for footprints of those changes in a short
time-frame results in conclusions of little implementation or of
unsuccessful attempts to bring about procedural change. When
the inquiry shifts from an immediate to a somewhat longer time
span, however, one finds significant alterations.
A Rules Codify Practice; Practice Persists
After Rules Change
The CJRA (like the enactment of a national rule in 1991 on
the size of civil juries) represents a national codification of prac-
tices that have already become embedded in culture and that
have garnered substantial (albeit not universal) support from
bench and bar. Because the changes predate 1990, it is not sur-
prising to find few effects of a reform of this magnitude in an
interval as short as four years.
I am not making the argument that Congress and the judi-
ciary were easy co-venturers in 1990, happily working together
to ratify changes already in place. Members of the judiciary
objected vehemently to the then-proposed legislation;66 some
commentators argued that the so-called "Biden Bill" infringed on
Article III prerogatives of federal judges.67 But step back from
65. RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 7-8.
The methodology involved relying on comparisons between ten pilot and ten compari-
son districts, and separately analyzing quantitative data from cases terminated in
1991 and those filed in 1992-93 after "the implementation of the pilot program
plans."
66. See, e.g., The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. on S. 2027 and S. 2648 [hereinafter CJRA Hearings], including
the testimony and statement of the Hon. Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., Chief Judge of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia at 208-209, 218-222; of the Hon-
orable Robert F. Peckham at 320-32; and of the Hon. Diana E. Murphy, then presi-
dent of the Federal Judges Organization, at 360-77, all objecting to the legislation as
then drafted.
67. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 379, 407-23 (1992) (discnssing "turf battles" between Congress
and the federal judiciary, and arguing that Congress had overstepped its authority).
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the description of the fray and consider the proposals found
within the CJRA; virtually all that is within the CJRA can also
be found in either the national or local federal rules, as they
were amended in the 1980s and again, after the CJRA, in the
1990s. These practices themselves evolved over several decades.
Hence, a first conclusion. National rulemaking-be it pro-
posed by Congress or the federal judiciary-frequently represents
codification of practice and reflection of change rather than the
commencement of newly-minted regimes.58 The footnote here is
that I am not claiming a meta-rule that insists national
rulemaking can never be the source of innovation.69 Rather, my
point is to underscore a strong tendency in contemporary
rulemaking to codify practice rather than to invent.
Moreover, I am also not arguing that national codification
represents an underlying unity-a single nation-wide set of
processes in place and then expressed by a national rule. Recall
that RAND found that most judges described little difference in
their practices, before and after the CJRA.70 (Those who man-
aged continued to do so, and those who did not, did not change.)
Codifying "national practice" thus provides a statement of
Cf. Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 961-62 (describing judicial objections
that the legislation would undermine their independence); Marcia Coyle, Senate Sets
its Sights on Delays in Civil Trials, NATL L.J. July 23, 1990, at 5 (describing ABA
and Judicial Conference opposition to the "mandatory nature" of the bill's proposals).
68. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2045 (1989)
(describing the "cross-pollination between state and federal procedure") [hereinafter
Subrin, Local Rules]. John Langbein observed that his experience with the Uniform
Law Conference is parallel: Most projects begin with examples from earlier practices,
and the tendency to borrow rather than innovate is endemic in legal systems
throughout the world. Letter from Professor John H. Langbein of Yale Law School to
Judith Resnik (Apr. 11, 1997) (on file with author).
69. See, for example, the 1966 revision of the class action rule, FED. R. CN. P.
23 and the 1938 rules themselves. See also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic
Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act 47 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript on file with author) (discussing legislative and judicial lawmaking, its
interaction, and offering categories of statutes as instrumental, expressive, and sym-
bolic). What Tushnet and Yackle term instrumental overlaps with my category of
"innovation," and my discussion of codifying practice relates to their use of the term
"symbolic." We all agree that, whether instrument, innovative, symbolic or codifying
practice, national rulemaking does have consequences that modify some behavior.
70. RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 84-
85.
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trends, as described and inscribed by judicial leaders including
those supported by institutions like the Federal Judicial Center
and the Judicial Conference, but the corollary points are that
practice persists after rules change and proponents of change
cannot always compel compliance. Below I sketch forty years of
work of judges and lawyers that is reflected in the CJRA.
1. The Sources of Judicial Management.-Congress de-
scribed the CJRA as framed by "principles" whose implementa-
tion was at the center of RAND's inquiry. According to the Act,
Congress hoped for use of six techniques: "differential case man-
agement;" "early judicial management;" "monitoring and control
of complex cases;" "encouragement of cost-effective discovery
through voluntary exchanges and cooperative discovery devices;"
"good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing mo-
tions;" and "referral of appropriate cases to alternative dispute
resolution programs."71
Those "principles" are not inventions of the 1990 Congress.
Each of them can be found in revisions in the 1980s to federal
and local rules, and then in subsequent revisions of those rules
after 1990.72 Further, the six principles (fairly reducible to
three-judicial management, discovery reform, and promotion of
alternative dispute resolution) have their sources in the work of
federal judges and of lawyers over the decades from the 1930s
through the 1980s.
Where do the ideas of judicial control, alternative processes,
burdensome discovery, and reliance on judges to process cases
come from? A first source is the structure of the 1938 rules
themselves. As is well explained by Professor Stephen Yeazell,
the 1938 rules created a pretrial phase of litigation in which
judges and lawyers had new opportunities for exchange.73 That
exchange was influenced by what Professor Stephen Subrin has
described as the 1938 rules' adoption of equity's orientation,
71. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 3; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 473.
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1993), 146 F.R.D. 427, 431 (1993); FED. R. CIV. P.
26 (1993), 146 F.R.D. 431 (1993).
73. Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REv. 631, 647-49 (1994) [hereinafter Yeazell, Misunderstood Circum-
stances].
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licensing discretionary behavior of judges.74
While the 1938 rules both created a space in which manage-
ment could occur and authorized judges to exercise discretion to
do so, the original rules did not articulate a strong vision of
judges as case managers. Rereading the original Rule 16, one
finds a description of the pretrial process both completely dis-
cretionary and focused on the preparation of cases for trial.75
Neither the word "discovery" nor "settlement" are mentioned in
the 1938 version of Rule 16.76 For the origins of today's judicial
case management with its reorientation of judicial role, one
must go outside the text of then-governing Rule 16, to practices
of judges and lawyers beginning in the 1930s in both state and
federal courts.
74. Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41.
75. The 1938 text read:
"Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues."
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for
findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by a jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of coun-
sel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its
discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be
placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar
to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions.
1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 37-38. See also David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A
Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1977-81
(1969) [hereinafter Shapiro, Federal Rule 16] (describing the drafting).
76. See infra, note 80 and accompanying text for drafter Charles Clark's view of
the deliberate exclusion of the discussion of settlement from the 1938 version of
Rule 16.
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a. State Practices: The Uses of the "Pre-Trial"
Like the downsizing of the civil jury, the development of
federal pre-trial processes has roots in state practices,77 ad-
mired by the federal rule drafters. The 1938 version of Rule 16
cites state and municipal court use of the "pre-trial,»78 and
some federal judges drew from that practice when incorporating
the pre-trial in their routine soon after the 1938 roles were promulgated.79
77. A Detroit judge, Ira w. Jayne, is credited with first initiating pre-trials in
1926. See Hon. Ira w. Jayne, Foreword, Symposium on Pre-Trial Procedures, 17
Omo ST. L.J. 160-162 (1956); !lARRy D. NIMS, PRE-TRIAL 16-17 (1950); Hon. Irving
R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision over Litigation, in
Seminar on Procedures For Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 207, 213
(1961) [hereinafter Kaufman, Effective Judicial Supervision).
New Jersey's use of pretrials was also a point of reference. See, e.g., Remarks
of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted
Case, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. at 376-77 (discussing need for the
pre-trials to be mandatory and to be held in advance of trial). Pre-trials were also
used in North Dakota, Tennessee, and Kansas. See NIMs, PRE-TRIAL at 8.
78. The Advisory Committee's notes refer to similar rules in the cities of Boston,
Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 38-39.
Reference was also made to the practice in England of "directions" and to the use of
pre-trial conferences for "discussion and identification of the actual points in dispute"
to facilitate presentations at trial. Id. at 297. In 1936, a Royal Commission had
published The Dispatch of Business at Common Law, discussing the pre-trial hearing
and its utility; that report is quoted in Pre-Trial Clinic, Demonstrations, a Confer-
ence co-sponsored by the Committee for the Improvement of the Administration of
Justice of the Judicial Conference of Senior Judges and by the Section of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association, 4 F.R.D. 35, 80-81 (1944) [hereinaf-
ter Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic).
In the 1990s, the English judiciary is reconsidering its practices; a recent
report endorses a form of case management. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
TO THE LoRD CHANCELLOR ON THE CML JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES
(July, 1996) (also known as "Lord Woolfs Report," after the chair, Lord Harry Woolf,
now Master of the Rolls and presiding judge in the Court of Appeal, Civil Division).
Description and criticism of that approach can be found in REFORM OF CML PROCE-
DURE (A.A.S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995) and in Michael Zander, Judi-
cial Case Management in England (distributed to participants in the CJRA Imple-
mentation Conference). For discussion of managerial approaches and civil justice
reform in Australia, see the Hon. G.L. Davies, Managing the Work of the Courts
(paper delivered at the Australian Institute for Judicial Administration Asia-Pacific
Courts Conference, Aug. 22-24, 1997) (on file with the author).
79. Following the promulgation of the Federal Rules, Judge George C. Sweeney
(of the federal district court in Boston) and Judge Bolitha J. Laws (of the federal
district court in the District of Columbia) were the first federal courts to set up a
pre-trial calendar and to bring the pre-trial conference to its full use. Report by the
Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure to the Judicial Administration Section of the Amer-
ican Bar Association 1 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report).
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 161 1997-1998
1997] Changing Practices, Changing Rules 161
Of course, when focused on the "practice," a question exists
about what that practice was. What happened at a "pre-trial"
and how does it comport with what occurs today? Equating the
1939 and the 1997 "pre-trial/pretrial" is unwise; indeed, the
word itself has changed, with the hyphen between "pre" and
"trial" dropping out. The earlier, hyphenated form reflected a
focus on trial preparation and clarification.so As one judicial
proponent pointed out: "pre-trial, perhaps is a misnomer; it is
rather a part of the actual trial."81 Others spoke of cases having
See also Ross W. Shumaker, An Appraisal of Pre-Trial in Ohio, 17 OHIO ST. L.J.
192, 196 (1956) [hereinafter Shumaker, Appraisal] (detailing pre-trial use by a feder-
al district judge as soon as the 1938 rules became effective); Hon. James Alger Fee,
Pre-Trial Conferences and Other Procedures Prior to Trial in the Ordinary Civil Ac-
tion, in Pre-Trial Procedure in Ordinary Civil Actions, in Proceedings of the Seminar
on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1958) (describing the District of Oregon as
using that practice since the inception of the Federal Rules and arguing that it was
"the most efficient device as yet di8covered for finding out what is the essential
controversy in a case before trial"); Herbert W. Clark, What Remedies for Refusal of
a Pre-Trial Conference? (mandatory use in the districts of Oregon and Massachu-
setts). Id. at 334, 335. By 1944, one report states that a majority of federal district
courts used pre-trial procedure. Will Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal
Judges, 4 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1944).
In terms of numbers of such conferences, in 1948, 3,716 pretrials were report-
ed; by 1951, the number was 8,202. 1952 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra at
11. These numbers require at a minimum the context of the number of civil cases
then pending and those concluded by trial. At the end of 1948, 49,215 civil cases
were pending; of the 37,769 cases terminated that year, 11.6 percent were disposed
of by trial. See 1948 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 47, 93 (Chart 8). Using the number of cases
pending in 1948, we know that, in about 7.6 percent, courts held pre-trials. Turning
to 1951, at the end of that year, 55,084 civil cases were pending. Of the 52,119 civil
cases terminated, trials were begun in 6962, or a bit more than 13 percent. 1951
ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
COURTS 52, 95, 148 (Table C7). Thus, in 1951, courts held pre-trials in about 14.9
percent of the cases.
80. In 1938, the ABA Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure described the pre-trial
as a "preview," during which the court should narrow the issues, to shorten and
speed the trial hearings, and avoid trial in cases where it is not useful. Report of
the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure, 63 Annual Report of the American Bar Asso-
ciation 534 (1938) [hereinafter 1938 ABA Committee Pre-Trial Committee Report].
Later, one of the original drafters, Charles E. Clark, sought to confine the rule to
that use. He argued that Rule 16, "in its inception and in its wording, makes it
clear that pre-trial is not intended as a substitute for trial; its whole tenor is that
of proper preparation for tria!." Hon. Charles E. Clark, To an Understanding Use of
Pre-Trial, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Adminis-
tration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 455 (1961) [hereinafter Understanding Use of Pre-Trial].
81. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 56 (Hon. Bolitha
J. Laws describing the practice in the District of Columbia).
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been "pre-tried," and some advocated that no case should be
permitted to be tried without that step.82 In contrast, today the
unhyphenated "pretrial" is a stage unto itself, no longer fixed on
trial but rather assumed to be the predicate to a conclusion
without trial.
Yet the concept of a pre-trial conference having ends other
than the trial itself was not outlandish from Rule 16's inception.
In 1944, the Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference
recommended that "orders with reference to both discovery and
summary judgment may be entered at the pre-trial conference in
appropriate cases."83 In the "demonstrations" held during the
same year, a mock pre-trial conference resulted in agreement for
a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination.54 By 1958, one
lawyer argued that Rule 16's pre-trial conference was a "discov-
ery device itself," to be used like a subpoena or a request for
documents, to gain information and expedite the process.85
In addition to the use of a pre-trial for discovery, many also
saw the pre-trial conference as the occasion for exploration of
settlement.86 Again the 1944 demonstrations (held to teach law-
82. Clark, Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, supra note 80, at 341. Charles Clark
described the role of the judge at the pre-trial as that of the "primary architect in
preparing the case for alljudication" and therefore, that the judge who was to pre-
side at the trial should preside at the pre-trial and the two events should not be
temporally far from each other. Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure,
17 Omo ST. L.J. 163, 165 (1956).
83. Pre-Trial Procedure, Committee Report, 4 F.R.D. 83, 97 (1944) (appended to
Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78. The Pre-Trial Committee's
recommendations included that, absent special circumstances, every civil case "should
be pre-tried before it is assigned for trial." [d. at 98.
84. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 61.
85. Manley B. Strayer, Discovery in Pretrial Conference Procedure in Proceedngs
on the Seminar in Protracted Litigation, 23 F.R.D. 347, 349 (1958) (describing prac-
tice in the District of Oregon, including the practice that pretrials be held "soon
after a case is filed," and stating that parties sometimes attend). See also Kaufman,
Effective Judicial Supervision, supra note 77, at 214 ("[i]n the ordinary case [the
pre-trial conference] is the apex of the discovery process, providing a final opportuni-
ty to narrow the issues ... and, generally streamline the case"); Jayne, 17 Omo
ST. L.J., supra note 77, at 162 (describing pre-trial in state courts in 1930s as pro-
viding a "preview" of each case).
Cf. Rule I1(A) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware, 4 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1112, 1115 (1961) ("So far as practicable all discov-
ery should be completed prior to pretrial. Pretrial should not be deemed a substitute
for discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
86. One of the pre-trial's major proponents, Advisory Committee member and
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yers and judges about this "most successful of the new proce-
dures"87) are illustrative. The mock pre-trials included judges
who raised the question of settlement.88 Other proponents re-
lied on state court examples in which pre-trials were scheduled
before trial dates were set and settlement was discussed.89
Judicial promotion of settlement at pre-trials was a particu-
larly controversial aspect of the procedure.90 We know this in
part from discussion about what place settlement had in pre-
trial proceedings.91 Proponents such as Justice Brennan ap-
Michigan law professor Edson Sunderland, described pre-trial hearings as typically
occurring about two weeks before trial, and that sometimes the case was settled, or
alternatively, the dispute was reduced in scope. He cited data from Detroit that
cases were dropped from the trial list. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 298-99. See
also 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80 at 537-39 (discus8ing the
use of pre-trials to avoid unnecessary trials by facilitating settlements); Hon. Bolitha
J. Laws, Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 397, 401-403 (1940) (speaking at an ABA
conference and explaining his settlement efforts, including reassuring counsel that
his views should not deter them from seeking their day in court).
87. These are the words of Judge Parker, who chaired the Judicial Confer-
ence/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 36.
88. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 54 ("The Court:
Have you gentlemen considered the possibility of a settlement or adjustment of this
matter?"); id. at 69 ("The Court: . . . Gentlemen, is there anything I can do to aid
you in the settlement of this case? Have you talked it over?," followed by a discus-
sion of a demand of $5,000, an offer of $3,000, and a judge asking: "Would you
consider giving an additional $l,OOO?," and, after additional exchanges, the judicial
statement: "The trial judge will probably bring up this matter of settlement again
before the actual trial starts . . . . [A]s I often have told counsel at pre-trial, I have
no desire to bring any pressure on you to settle," followed by a direction to the
clerk to note that "the estimated time of trial is five days, and . . . the prospects of
settlement are good.").
89. See Harry D. Nims, Some By-Products of Pre-Trial, 17 Omo ST. L.J. 185,
187 (1956) (discussing a 1955 report of the New York Temporary Commission on the
Courts, describing a settlement rate of 95 percent of the cases in the State Supreme
Court and arguing for earlier settlements, before cases were listed for trial; also
describing a 1954 Judicial Survey Commission of Massachusetts which urged settle-
ment and that "a vigorous effort" should be made to help pre-trial do its "proper
work") [hereinafter Nints, By-Products of Pre-Trial]. See also 1952 ABA Pre-Trial
Committee Report, supra note 79, at 5 (discussing accidents involving the Long Is-
land Railroad, the pre-trial of 200 cases within eleven days, and 92 settlements).
90. But not its exclusive source of controversy. See, e.g., comments of Detroit
Judge Moynihan, discussing the early opposition to pre-trial; that he was "threatened
with constitutional actions and told [he] had no authority and [he] was invading the
rights of lawyers and litigants, and [he] was depriving people of trials by jury, and
many other things." Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 47.
91. See, e.g., Shumaker, supra note 79, at 205 (quoting a recommendation of the
1944 Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference that "the committee considers
that settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure, rather than a primary
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provingly described the link between pretrial conferences and
settlement in New Jersey courts92 and opponents, such as
Judge Clark, inveighed against a focus on settlement during pre-
trials. Some federal judges were plainly enthusiasts of the view
that pre-trials, in federal court, like some state courts, was "to
enlarge justice by consent and to reduce the need for judgment
by command.»93 Charles Clark, among others, firmly disagreed.
Relying on his authority as an original drafter of the Federal
Rules, he opined: "It is no mere chance that no provision is
made [in Rule 16] for settlement negotiations; those are no part
of a proper pre-trial.»94 Charles Clark also weighed in that the
objective to be actively pursued by the judge"); Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-Trial
Procedure: A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.RD. 417, 420 (1953) ("settlement of
cases is not a primary objective of pre-trial conferences, but, when properly present-
ed, it is an important by-product and often the logical result of pre-trial"); Kaufman,
Effective Judicial Supervision, supra note 77, at 215 (settlement as a "legitimate and
important by-product of pretrial," reducing the disruption caused by settlements on
the eve of trial); Hon. William F. Smith, Pretrial Conference-A Study of Methods, in
Seminar on Procedures, 29 F.RD. 348, 352 ("while settlement should not be regard-
ed as a primary objective of the pretrial conference, the discussion of the prospects
of settlement should not be avoided by the trial judge"); O.W. Whitney, Jr., Adapt-
ability of Pre-Trial to the Less Populated Counties, 17 Omo ST. L.J. 171, 173 (1956)
(discussing the personal relations among bar members as facilitating settlement but
that settlement is not the "sole or prime purpose" of pre-trial).
92. Brennan, supra note 77, at 378 ("We have learned that 'cards face up on
the table' before we go to trial will lead, as we have found in New Jersey definitely
that it does, to settlements.").
93. Shumaker, Appraisal, supra note 79, at 200-01 (quoting Mahoning County,
Ohio's rule, which also provided that in cases not terminated prior to trial, parties
could request reassignment to another judge for trial).
94. Clark, Understanding Use of Pre-trial, supra note 80, at 455-56, in Proceed-
ings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, July, 1961
(also invoking New Jersey's famous chief judge, Arthur Vanderbilt, as not tolerating
"maneuvering" as a part of pre-trials and allowing "settlement negotiations only
quite apart from the hearing and only at the side bar of the court"). Clark argued
that "the function [of the pre-trial] is to see that the parties and the court are fully
acquainted with the case, leaving no room for the tactic of surprise attack or de-
fense, and to uncover and record the points of agreement between the parties-all to
the end of shortening and simplifying the eventual trial." Id. at 456. See also
Charles E. Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial as a Part of Trial, in Seminar on
Protracted Cases, 23 F.RD. 319, 506, 509-10 (1958) (describing "pre-trial at its best
is just a part of the trial itself' and criticizing the conception of pre-trials as a "fail-
ure unless the parties are dragooned into a settlement"). See also Shumaker, Ap-
praisal, supra note 79, at 201, 204 (describing one Ohio County's rule, different from
the others, that "if settlement is to be had there is no reason to have a pre-trial
conference. Pre-Trial should not be primarily for settlement," and describing the use
of pre-trial for settlement as the "most controversial" aspect of the practice).
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judge who pre-tried a case should try it. Because the judge at
the pre-trial was the "primary architect in preparing the case for
adjudication," that judge should preside at a trial, close in time
to the pre_trial.95 But not all courts adopted that view; in sever-
al jurisdictions, one judge did the pre-trial and another presided
at trial.96
To summarize, in the early years under Rule 16, its use and
function was debated as state and federal judges argued on
behalf of its utility--either as a means of detailing the contours
of a trial or as a means of avoiding that trial. Adjudication
served as a dominant end-point. But while seen as a principal, if
not exclusive, focus of the judicial process, trials were not de-
scribed as desirable events. Rather, even as fierce a proponent of
cabining pre-trial procedures as Charles Clark considered that
during pre-trials, as parties made final selections of facts in
dispute, they might also learn of the views they shared, and "go
the small remaining distance to reach a settlement without the
agony of trial."97 Further, Clark promoted the concept of the
trial judge as skillful at pre-trials, perhaps "more effective ...
than one who may be able to turn out well-rounded opinions."98
"Pre-trial is not a matter for errand boys or clerks. Rather it is
the high function on the part of both judge and counsel."99
See also a 1960 local rule from the Eastern District of North Carolina that
"the primary objective of pre-trial should be to facilitate trial and a just judgment,"
and that "compromise settlement shall be regarded as a by-product of such proce-
dure rather than the end sought," and another from the Western District of North
Carolina, which provided that "any party has the right to decline to discuss settle-
ment and insist on an immediate trial." Both are quoted in Comment: The Local
Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J.
lOll, 1054 [hereinafter Local Rules Surveyl.
95. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 165.
96. NIMS, PRE·TRIAL, supra note 77, at 20, 29, 31, 38, 54 (describing such prac-
tices in New York, Massachusetts, D.C., Delaware, and Texas); see also 1938 ABA
Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 538 (emphasizing how freely the par-
ties could feel to discuss their chances for prevailing at trial, since the pretrial judge
"will not (ordinarily) be the one who hears the case").
97. Clark, Objectives of the Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 164.
98. [d. at 165.
99. [d. at 166. Clark stated that he hoped the symposium on pre-trial would
"promote the conviction that the judge's finest accomplishment is adjudication on the
basis of a case properly developed by astute counsel, with his own pronouncements
largely muted, rather than the ex-cathedra pronouncement of the formal opinion." [d.
at 170.
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b. Protracted Cases: Calling for Control
For some, it was state court practices in ordinary litigation
that anchored their views on the utility of a "pre-trial;" for other
judges, it was their experiences with larger, "protracted" cases
that committed them to the vision of judge as useful overseer of
the pretrial arena. When the problems of "protracted cases"
became the focus, aspects of state court pre-trial practice were
modified. State courts relied on different judges during the phas-
es of a case, but, as detailed below, promoters of pre-trial in the
"big case" argued that a single judge should control such cases
from filing to disposition.
In the early 1950s, in the wake of anti-trust litigation that
had been filed in several federal districts, the federal judiciary
turned its concerns to what were then called "protracted" cas-
es.loo A first judicial committee, chaired by Judge Barrett
Prettyman, produced a report on the problem,lol and a second
committee, chaired by Judge Alfred Murrah, wrote a "Handbook
ofRecommended Procedures for the Trial ofProtracted Cases" to
teach judges to respond to these cases.102 The response advo-
cated was that
[t]he judge assigned should at the earlier moment take actual
control of the case and rigorously exercise such control through-
out the proceedings in such case.lOS
Specifically, that judge ("iron-hearted" in demeanorlO4) was
100. See Committee to Study Procedure in Anti-Trust and other Protracted Cases
(also called the "Prettyman Committee," after its chair, the Hon. E. Barrett
Prettyman), Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953)
(discussing such cases as posing an "acute major problem in the current administra-
tion of justice" and suggesting that trial judges should provide firm oversight in the
preparation for trial to avoid undue expense and waste); Hon. Alfred P. Murrah,
Background of the Seminar, in Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judg-
es 319, 386 (1958) [hereinafter Background of the Seminar] ("[T]he judicial process
was literally breaking down under the weight of these cases.").
101. 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953).
102. 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) [hereinafter Handbook for Protracted Cases]. See also
Alfred Murrah, Foreword, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1958)
[hereinafter Foreword].
103. 23 F.R.D. at 614-15.
104. 25 F.R.D. at 384 (attributing the phrase to a 1951 speech by Judge
Prettyman).
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 167 1997-1998
1997] Changing Practices, Changing Rules 167
supposed to hold conferences to get "acquainted" with both coun-
sel and the case,10S define issues beyond what was set forth in
the pleadings and authorize discovery only within "the bounds"
of the issues so delineated,l06 require counsel to confer prior to
bringing discovery disputes to the judge,107 employ masters to
supervise discovery if needed/08 establish a "tentative timeta-
ble" for the phases of the litigation, including scheduling mo-
tions and forecasting the time to trial,l09 "promote" stipulations
of fact among parties,l1O consider bifurcation of issues for tri-
al,lll organize and limit the presentation of proof at trial/12
and control the use of experts on and proof of "complicated scien-
tific, technical and economic facts."113
As the details of these directives demonstrate, the activities
identified as important in 1953 for the protracted case are in
1997 considered appropriate for the ordinary case. That applica-
tion was less obvious three decades ago. In many respects, the
protracted case was conceptualized as different from the rest of
the docket and because of that difference, in need of a distinct
kind of process. As the Preface to the Handbook for Protected
Cases explained:
Let it be emphasized this is not the ordinary litigation; our sub-
ject is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred amid
the tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars.114
Because these cases were "rare," the judge dispatched to control
these cases was instructed to act in a special capacity.lls Un-
like ordinary litigation, in which under the master calendar sys-
105. Id. at 385 (IVA "The First Pre-Trial Conference: Timing; Order Setting
Conference; Scope").
106. Id. at 387.
107. Id. at 396.
108. Id. at 392-93.
109. 25 F.R.D. 395 ("Early designation of an unalterable time for trial has many
benefits.").
110. Id. at 397.
111. Id. at 403.
112. Id. at 405-407.
113. Id. at 415-431.
114. Handbook for Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 359.
115. Id. at 383 ("Control of a case during the trial thereof is familiar to all trial
judges. But here we speak of control of the case in its procedural aspects prior to
trial as well as during the trial itself.").
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tem then in use, different judges worked on phases of the same
lawsuit,116 in protracted litigation, a single judge would be as-
signed "for all purposes" and would need relief from other du-
ties. ll7 Hence, procedures crafted for the "big" case might have
been understood as appropriately applied only to litigation fit-
ting that criterion.118
But early on, some judges insisted on the similarity between
the "ordinary" and the "big" case.119 As one judge explained to
his colleagues: "[a]s far as techniques are concerned, you are
driving at the same end and obviously enough you go through
the same motions."120 Thus the summary of recommendations
from the first Seminar on Protracted Cases proposed: "The tech-
niques suggested herein will likewise save time, lighten calen-
dars and further justice in most cases."121
2. The Means ofChange: Local Rulemaking, Judicial Educa-
tion, and Constituencies for Judge-Lawyer Contact.-I have
sketched the sources from which the principles of the 1990s
CJRA evolved. A distinct issue is how individual judges' experi-
ences and preferences made their way into widespread use and
then into rules and statutes. Three other parts of twentieth
116. See Calendaring Systems, in Seminar on Procedures, supra note 80, at 227-
279 (Hon. James M. Carter, Hon. Albert A. Ridge, Hon. Edwin M. Stanley, Hon.
George L. Hart, Jr., Prof. Maurice Rosenberg, all discussing pros and cons of individ-
ual and master calendar systems).
117. See Murrah, Handbook for Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 373, 377,
384 (recommending that assignment be made "to one judge for all purposes" to en-
able "his prompt assumption of control" and that "necessary adjustments should be
made in the normal case load of the assigned judge.").
118. See, e.g., Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, The Importance of the Problem, in
Seminar in Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395, 405 (1957) (questioning whether the
"American judicial system [could] devise procedures for such controversies no matter
how big or complicated").
119. Fee, supra note 79, at 381.
120. Id. at 382. The seminar had devoted a day to the use of pre-trial procedure
"in the ordinary civil action" at the suggestion of Judge Fee, who had also done
such a program for the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. Murrah, Background of
the Seminar, supra note 100, at 319.
121. Murphy, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 521. Further,
judges recommended a parallel procedure for "'big' criminal cases," albeit with accom-
modations in light of criminal defendants' constitutional rights. See Murrah, Hand-
book for Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 399-403; William B. West, ill, Crimi-
nal Pre-Trials-Useful Techniques, in Seminar on Procedures, 29 F.R.D. 436, 436-41
(1961).
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century federal procedural history thus become relevant: the
growth of local rules, changes in the size and composition of
both the judicial and legal professions, and the advent of the
federal judiciary as an organized bureaucracy and training cen-
ter for federal judges. This is not the occasion upon which to
provide a full history of any, but a brief foray into all three top-
ics is necessary.
a. Local Rules Communicating Techniques
Local rules provide a vehicle for judicial communication of
changes afoot in operating practices. As is familiar, the 1938
Rules provided that district courts could make additional rules
not inconsistent with the national regime.122 As many commen-
tators have documented over the decades, local rules have ex-
panded in scope and number.l23 In terms of the national rule of
particular interest here-Rule 16-some of the local rules echoed
a pre-trial of which Charles Clark would have approved. Such
rules either left the matter to the discretion of the district
judge124 or used the pre-trial to organize the case for trial, in-
cluding provisions for introduction of exhibits and the like.125
In contrast, other local rules expanded the domain of the pre-
trial, such as requiring that lawyers meet in advance of the pre-
trial conference to make agreements and write documents detail-
ing their positions, authorizing the discussion of settlement (but
122. FED. R. Cw. P. 83 (1938) ("Each district court by action of a majority of the
judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice
not inconsistent with these rules . . . • In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules."). See generally Subrin, Local Rules, supra note 68, at 2011-16 (discussing the
history of local rulemaking and the assumption that some such rulemaking would be
needed under the then nascent federal rules, and the drafting of Rule 83).
123. Id. at 2018·21. Professor Robel notes that the 1988 amendments to the
Rules Enabling Act attempted to address the divergence by requiring notice and
review of local rulemaking. Robel, Local Advisory Groups, supra note 56, at 881
n.12. See also FED. R. Cw. P. 83, as amended in 1995.
124. E.g., Rule 12 of the Rules for the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, 4 Fed. Rules Servo 2d 1137, 1140 (1960) ("The court
may hold pre-trial conferences in any civil case upon notice to counsel for all par-
ties.").
125. E.g., Rule 11 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware, 4 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1112, 1115 (1961).
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not its inclusion in a pre-trial order), and threatening the impo-
sition of sanctions.126 That such requirements exceeded the na-
tional rules is yet another illustration of disuniformity, dis-
cussed earlier in the context of downsizing the civil jury.127
Several local rules on case management display a parallel dis-
loyalty to the national regime.
b. Judges as Teachers and "Proselytizers"
While local rules provide a medium for individual judges
within a district to express their shared commitments,l28 a crit-
ical element in the transformation of the role of the federal
judge was communication across the United States judiciary.
Others have chronicled the growth of the federal judiciary as a
self-conscious bureaucracy;129 my focus here is on the federal
126. E.g., Calendar Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Rules 13-16, 4 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1157, 1158-63 (1961); for criti-
cism of this packet as beyond the scope of Rule 16 and providing inappropriate pen-
alties for non-compliance, see Clark, Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, supra note 80,
at 458-60. Judge Clark's comments often linked the expansion of pre-trial beyond
what he claimed was intended with his concerns about erosion of general pleadings
rules, particularly in large cases. See Charles E. Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's
Paper on the Place of the Pleadings in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big
Case," in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 435 (1958); see also his opin-
ion for the Second Circuit in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.
1957).
Other examples of local rules expanding the Rule 16 practice include Rule 3
("Informal Conference-Pre-Trial Statements"); Rule 4 ("Contents and Form of Pre-
Trial Statements"); Rule 6 ("Pre-Trial"), of the Rules of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, 6 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1263, 1264-67
(1962); and Rule 7 ("Pre-Trial") of the Rules of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina, 5 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1148, 1158-60 (1962).
Some local rules expressly authorized discussion of settlement at pre-trial conferenc-
es. See, e.g., Rule 15(c) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, 5 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1109, 1113 (1961); Rule 7(LX4) of the North
Carolina Rules, supra at 1159.
See also Shapiro, Federal Rule 16, supra note 75, at 1982-83 (discussing the
practice of expanding requirements in pre-trial conferences).
127. See supra, notes 7-27 and accompanying text. See also discussion infra, Sec-
tion ill D.
128. "Local," "local" rules or standing orders, issued by an individual judge and
stating that judge's own rule regime, express that judge's variation from or a refusal
to abide by a district's local rules.
129. See, e.g., WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990).
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judiciary as a teaching institution, aimed at educating judges
about a particular set of attitudes to take toward their work.
That interest requires a brief explication of the evolution of the
federal judiciary as a self-administering, staffed, data-collecting
entity that set about (in connection with other organizations) to
train judges and lawyers under the 1938 rule regime.
Through the work of judges, administrative staff, lawyers,
and law teachers as they met at judicial conferences, at bar-
hosted events, and at law schools, different modes of case pro-
cessing were described and inscribed. Committees and institu-
tions were created because of the felt need for change and as a
means of reiterating particular visions of the shape such change
should take. The discussion that follows therefore returns to
many of the materials described above to consider the sources of
the commentaries and the modes of their dissemination.
A first development of relevance is the formal investiture of
a group of judges with administrative responsibility for the fed-
eral judiciary, which in turn relates to the growth in the number
of federal judges. In 1922, Congress created twenty-five new
federal judgeships and an administrative body, the Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges. Congress authorized the conference to
meet annually; its judges were "to advise as to the needs of his
circuit and as to any matters in respect of which the administra-
tion of justice in the courts of the United States may be im-
proved."130 In 1948, a renamed conference, now called the "Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States," continued the work of its
130. Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42, Stat. 837, 838. Congress authorized a
"$10 per day" travel reimbursement. Id. at 839. See also Henry P. Chandler, Some
Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 318 (1963)
[hereinafter Major Advances]. As Chandler tells the history, a major impetus to
administrative reform in the nineteenth century was the erratic quality of clerks of
court. Id. at 313-17. The creation in the early twentieth century of the conference
was in response to growing dockets and interest in judicial reform, including ABA
activities that also produced the Rules Enabling Act and the 1938 Federal Rules.
When William Howard Taft became Chief Justice in 1921, he took to Congress ideas
he had advanced in the 1910s at the ABA about the creation of an administrative
body. While loath to adopt his request for "judges at large," (i.e., not sitting in a
designated district but free to be assigned on an "as needed" basis), Congress did
authorize the conference. Id. at 318-30. One objector, Representative Clarence Lea of
California, both argued that the such a committee would perform legislative func-
tions and "become the propaganda organization for legislation for the benefit of the
Federal judiciary." Id. at 328.
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predecessor.131
The work of these judges was enabled by the creation of
staff offices to support them. Congress has formed two such
entities: the Administrative Office ("AD") of the United States
Courts, established in 1939, to "examin[e] the state of the dock-
ets" and "transmit. .. statistical data" on the COurtS,132 and
the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), created in 1967 to "further
the development and adoption of improved judicial administra-
tion" by undertaking research, staffing judicial committees, and
conducting "programs of continuing education and training for
personnel of the judicial branch."133
Moving back to the 1940s, the judiciary's Conference char-
tered committees, including a "Pre-Trial Committee."l34 In the
131. Judicial Code and Judiciary, ch. 646, § 331 62 Stat. 902 (1948) (codified and
then amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 (1994». The 1948 codification repeats much of
the 1922 statute; added was a requirement that the Chief Justice report annually to
Congress on the work of the Judicial Conference. The work of the Judicial Confer-
ence has been altered over the past few decades by amendments that changed the
composition of the Conference. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-202, 71
Stat. 476 (providing for the inclusion of district judges); modified the work on
rulemaking (Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, and Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988»; provided for the Conference's authority in judicial disability proceedings
(Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 1980); and most recently, revised selection procedures and
terms of members of the Conference. (Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847). For an illustrated history, see Judicial Conference of the
United States Celebrates its 75th Anniversary, 29 THE THIRD BRANCH 1-20 (Sept.
1997) (counting the creation of the Conference of Senior Judges as the founding).
132. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 304(2), 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1944».
133. Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 620, 81 Stat. 664 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 620-29 (1967». See also Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics
of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1988) [hereinafter Wheeler, Empirical Research]. Once again,
the creation of both institutions comes after the existence of some of the work that
each entity assumed; prior to the creation of the Administrative Office, the Depart-
ment of Justice had been collecting data on the docket and, as detailed below, prior
to the 1968 creation of the FJC, the federal judiciary had begun its educational
efforts.
134. See Chandler, Major Advances, supra note 130; Judicial Conference/ABA
Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78; NIMS, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, at 191. The com-
mittee was first chaired by Chief Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit. The
committee issued its report in 1944 and concluded its term. It was reactivated in
1947 and was chaired by Judge Alfred P. Murrah, who would lead the committee
and also the Federal Judicial Center.
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1950s, that committee expressed its concern about the lack of
implementation of the 1951 Report on Procedure in Antitrust
and Other Protracted Cases;l35 the Chief Justice responded in
1956 by appointing federal district judges from each circuit "to
study the pre-trial problems peculiar to protracted civil and
criminal litigation."l36 A few years earlier, New York
University's Institute for Judicial Adrninistrationl37 had begun
a series of seminars for judges; in 1957, the federal judges' com-
mittee joined with NYU for the first "Seminar on Protracted
Cases for United States Circuit and District Judges," and others
followed at law schools around the United States.l38
Shortly thereafter, in 1960, the Judicial Conference expand-
ed the focus by authorizing seminars for judges and lawyers "for
the purpose of exploring the most effective techniques for the
utilization of the pretrial and trial procedures contemplated by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."l39 In addition to the
135. Murrah, Background of the Seminar, supra note 100, (discussing the
committee's work in the 1950s).
136. Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword, supra note 102, at 401.
137. Established in 1952, 21 F.R.D. at 404. Arthur Vanderbilt, former dean of
NYU, former President of the American Bar Association, and then Chief Justice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, was pivotal in its founding. During the 1930s and
1940s, Vanderbilt worked on the creation of "Minimum Standards for Judicial Ad-
ministration," and then pressed for law schools to become more involved in judicial
reform and for law teachers to be more cognizant of social science data. In its early
years, the Institute for Judicial Administration (IJA) served as a clearinghouse on
judicial administration and published reports on the organization of courts and case-
loads. In 1956, the IJA began an appellate judges seminar, which continues in the
1990s in two sessions, one for new judges and one for judges with more years of
service on appellate courts. See FANNIE J. KLEIN, CHANGING THE SYsTEM: THE
TwENTY-FIVE YEAR CRUSADE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN COURTS, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1977).
138. 21 F.R.D. at 395-96. A second followed in California at Stanford in 1958
(Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.RD.
319 (1958», and a third occcurred in 1959 at the University of Colorado. See
Foreword, Handbook for Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 355, 360 and nn.1-2.
The first seminar ended with resolutions, including that the Prettyman Report was
the "foundation and Bible for handling such [protracted] cases" and that single judge
assignments and judicial control were central responses. J. John W. Murphy, Sum-
mary and Resolutions, in Seminar for Protracted Cases, 21 F.RD. 395, 519-20 (1957).
A related seminar, On Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, was held at
Southern Methodist University in 1961 and documented at 29 F.RD. 191, supra
note 80.
139. Resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 29 F.RD. 192
(1962) (authorizing the Committee on Pretrial Procedure, "in cooperation with the
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seminars on "protracted" cases, federal judicial leaders did a
series of programs for newly-appointed judges. As Judge
Murrah, who served as a Director of the Federal Judicial Center
described them, "the seminars and conferences have been by and
for judges ... planned and largely executed by a group of sea-
soned judges."140
One of the agendas of this educational effort was to teach
judges about "effective judicial supervision of litigation 'from
cradle to grave,,"141 and another was to educate lawyers about
new procedures.142 The proponents were self-described
"proselytizers."143 As the New York Times described the effort,
"The Federal judicial hierarchy is pushing a campaign to make
its trial judges abandon their tradition~role as passive umpires
between opposing lawyers and to become more masterful in
controlling trialS."I44 The emphasis on management in the
1960s reflected a general interest in "systems management," in
vogue in business at the time,145 and a view of the need for the
federal judiciary to modernize.146 The agenda was not, howev-
Committee on Court Administration" to conduct such meetings or seminars and to
conduct a "special study for the purpose of developing a statement of the essentials
of pretrial and trial practice for presentation to the Judicial Conference for its con-
sideration and adoption").
140. Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword to Reports of the Conference for District Court
Judges, 59 F.R.D. 205 (1973) (also thanking West Publishing Company for publishing
the proceedings) [hereinafter 1973 Foreword].
141. Kaufman, Effective Judicial Supervision, supra note 77, at 207 (quoting
Chief Judge Murrah).
142. NIMS, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, at 191-95 (describing "demonstrations" of
pre-trials held around the country during 1948-50 and attended by hundreds of at-
torneys). The text of some of the simulations can be found in at the appendix. Id. at
206-49.
143. Id. ("we plead guilty to utilizing the next few days to proselytize ... [but]
most of the techniques will also prove helpful to all judges regardless of whether
they are converted to our belief in early judicial intervention").
144. More U.S. Judges Go to School, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1965.
145. See HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 129, at 13-14 (discussing the dimen-
sions of a "[t]echnocratic [r]ationalization of (j]ustice" to include a respect for a "busi-
ness orientation" and a legitimation of administrative modes); id. at 38-29 (quoting
congressional support for the creation of the Federal Judicial Center because it will
help bring "[m]anagement experts, systems analysts, data interpreters, personnel ex-
perts" together with judges).
146. In the 1960s, the judiciary commissioned a study of its own processes; the
North American Rockwell Information Systems Company prepared a report, A Man-
agement and Systems Survey of the u.S. Courts (1969) (excerpts on me with author).
Proponents of judicial management argued it is essential for courts to keep pace
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er, simply a question of caseload rationalization but rather one
of altering the modes of process, to create "speedier and more
effective procedures."147
At many of these "new judges" conferences in the 1960s,
discussions ofjudges as managers and settlers were often accom-
panied by the comment that the role was controversial. But (at
least in the materials I have located thus far), the judicial lec-
turers at such conferences were not those opposed to such roles
for judges. Rather, the proponents mentioned opposition, as they
rebutted charges that such a role was inappropriate or un-
wise.148 Over time, the discussion of case management became
more assured, with the judge envisioned as appropriately en-
gaged in settlement.149 By 1973, some participants described a
"trend ... from settlement as part of a pretrial conference (to
get the parties talking) to the beginning of a separately identifi-
with social change. Kaufman, Effective Judicial Supervision, supra note 77, at 210.
State court management institutions began in the 1970s. See HEYDEBRAND & SERON,
supra note 129, at 41.
147. Kaufman, Effective Judicial Supervision, supra note 77, at 212. See also a
"state of the judiciary" address of Chief Justice Burger, who in 1970 raised his con-
cern that, aside from the federal rules, the "judicial processes for resolving cases and
controversies have remained essentially static for 200 years." Chief Justice Warren
Burger, State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 933 (1970).
148. See, e.g., Hon. Edward S. Northrop, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement
Process, 1970-71; Peter Fay, Settlement Approaches; The Hon. Noel P. Fox, Settle-
ment: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill their Responsibility, in Seminars for Newly
Appointed United States District Judges at 235 (1970-71) (all on file with author). A
published version of this talk is discussed infra, note 154. In the 1976 proceedings
for the Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, Judges Hubert
L. Will, Robert R. Merhige, Jr., and Alvin B. Rubin gave a lecture with the same ti-
tle, celebrating settlement and judicial assistance of settlement; included are exam-
ples of how to mediate cases and evaluate their worth as well as an outline of sug-
gestions on the "judge's role in stimulating settlement negotiations," with headings
such as "The Beginning Moves," "The Atmosphere," and "Tactics." Hubert L. Will,
Robert Mehige, Jr. & Alvin Rubin, The Role in the Settlement Process, in Seminar
for Newly Appointed District Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 203, 227-232 (1976).
149. See, e.g., Hon. Walter E. Craig & Dean Gordon A. Christenson, The Settle-
ment Process, Report of Seminar F in Reports of the Conference for District Judges,
supra note 140, at 252, 253-54 (describing discussion of the "richness and variety of
judge's skills in the settlement role" and the "creative ingenuity to generate new
techniques rapidly" including ex parte meetings with counsel and sealed estimates on
recommendations of sums, and noting that the judge was moving from the role in a
"traditional pretrial conference" toward a process "of mediation"); see also Will,
Merhige, & Rubin, supra note 148, (expressing enthusiasm about the judicial settle-
ment role).
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able process of mediation and conciliation."150 In other words,
what the 1990 CJRA terms "alternative dispute resolution" had
begun to emerge.151
By 1968, when Congress created the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter, judges had been lecturing to and educating each other for
several years.152 Like the transformation of practice into rules,
many of the activities ofjudicial education pre-dated the institu-
tion (the FJC) that became their sponsor.153 According to the
programs from those sessions,154 as of 1971, new judges were
150. Murrah, 1973 Foreword, supra note 140.
151. The relationship between alternative dispute resolution and courts changed
over the decades. One illustration comes from commentary in 1971, at the District of
Columbia Circuit's Judicial Conference, about the need for what the conferees termed
"non-judicial means" of dispute resolution. See Excerpts from Proceedings of the Thir-
ty-Second Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 54 F.R.D.
107, 142 (1971) ("Panel and Discussion-Non-Judicial Means of Resolving Legal Dis-
putes"). The term "non-judicial means" enables us to understand that, in the 1970s,
arbitration, administrative resolutions, and "alternative grievance" procedures were
all understood as activities occurring outside those of the judiciary. Changes in the
language of Rule 16 provide similar insight. In the 1983 amendments to the rule,
reference is made to "extrajudicial" procedures. See FED. R. CN. P. 16(cX7) (1983).
By the 1990s, however, the judiciary had reformatted its processes to include
ADR. The 1993 amendments to Rule 16 thus speak of "special procedures to assist
in resolving the dispute." Today we understand these procedures as "judicial" means
of resolving disputes. See FED. R. CN. P. 16(cX9) (1993). As the 1993 Advisory Note
explains, the revision "more accurately" describes the procedures that, aside from
"traditional settlement conferences ... may be helpful in settling litigation." FED. R.
CN. P. 16, advisory committee's note (1993). See generally Judith Resnik, Many
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 Omo ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995), also reprinted by RAND (1995).
152. See also 1948 Annual Report of the Director of the U.S. Courts, supra note
79, at 51 (discussing "demonstrations of the practice [of pre-trials] in actual cases
before meetings of members of the bar and judges," a Judicial Conference Committee
attempted to "show how [pre-trial] can be most effectively employed"). In addition to
judicial education on the federal side, the states launched parallel efforts, and in
1964, the National College for the State Judiciary was established in Reno, Nevada.
See KLEIN, supra note 137, at 40.
153. With the establishment of such an organization, the judiciary obtained a
means to exercise some control over its own management as well as a vehicle for
disseminating norms on judging. See Wheeler, Empirical Research, supra note 133,
at 44-51 (arguing that the Judicial Conference lacked effective means to implement
its proposals and that the structure of the FJC enabled judges to control research
and education more than some legislators desired).
154. With the help of Rob Jones, librarian Matt Sarago, and staff at the Federal
Judicial Center, I have located programs, beginning in 1971 from seminars for new-
ly-appointed United States District Judges. Some of the programs, including those
that pre-date the FJC, resulted in publications by West Publishing, in free-standing
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instructed about the "concept of judicial responsibility for the
disposition of litigation" during an initial orientation session
conducted by Judge Murrah; other sessions included "manage-
ment of civil case flow from filing to trial," and "the role of the
judge in the settlement process."155 By 1976, Judge Hubert L.
Will was instructing that, "most cases ... are better disposed of,
in terms of highest quality of justice, by a negotiated-freely
negotiated-settlement, than by the most beautiful trial that
you can preside over."156 By 1990, when the Hon. William
Schwarzer assumed the directorship of the FJC, civil manage-
ment training became a day-long session.157
One other comment on the role of judicial education institu-
tions in promoting case management is in order. These institu-
tions are self-conscious actors, in need of support (including
funding) and attentive to risks of alienating their audience or
sponsors. As explained by Gordon Bermant and Russell R.
Wheeler, the FJC institution sought to develop curricula that
avoided "contaminating the stream of adjudication" and was
"free from biases and special pleading."l58 A focus on case man-
agement and the pre-trial processes appears to meet that need;
judicial economy, improved administration, reducing costs, and
accelerating dispositions are all topics that appear "merely"
paperback books, the earliest of which appears to have been in 1962. Excerpts from
proceedings appear in some of the Federal Rules Decisions. See, e.g., Hon. Noel P.
Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129 n.1
(1972) (describing his talk as "public property ..• prepared for a public purpose as
part of the seminar program for newly appointed district judges"), and Proceedings of
Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89 (1976).
155. 1971 Program (on file with author). In 1987, a session (conducted by Prof.
Francis McGovern) was devoted to ADR. Program for Seminar for Newly Appoin~d
Judges at 3 (Nov. 16-20, 1987) (on file with author).
156. Hubert L. Will, Judicial Responsibility for the Disposition of Litigation, in
Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, 75 F.R.D.
117, 123 (1976).
157. Program for Seminar for Newly Appointed Judges at 2-5 (June 17-22, 1990)
(on file with author). Several years earlier, additional special programs were devel-
oped devoted to case management. See, e.g., Programs for District Court Case Man-
agement Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia (Mar. 21-23, 1983) and periodically thereafter
(on file with author).
158. Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, From Within the System: Education-
al and Research Programs at the Federal Judicial Center 114-115 (initially in RE-
FORMING THE LAw, G. Melton, ed., 1987 and also provided as a monograph from the
FJC).
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procedural and offer a superficially safe haven from partisan-
ship.
In addition to activities within institutions of the judiciary,
the other organizations of relevance to the promotion and dis-
semination of pretrial management are the American Bar Asso-
ciation and law schools. The ABA has long been a key partici-
pant in the rule regime; the ABA was central to the enactment
of the Rules Enabling Act in 1935 that authorized the formula-
tion of a nationwide set of federal rules,159 and the ABA has
also played an important role in popularizing those rules by
teaching lawyers and judges about the meaning and use of those
rules and in working with judges to popularize them.l60 The
ABA's Pre-Trial Committee, formed in the late 1930s, predated
the one created by the federal judiciary.l6l The ABA co-spon-
sored some of the "clinics" and conferences,162 many of which
occurred at law schools, which served both as venues for confer-
ences and as publishers of the results. l63 Another important
means of dissemination was the West Publishing Company,
which as a "courtesy" to judges, provided free publication of
proceedings of many of the conferences.l64
In sum, as one reads the materials about the promotion of
case management, a group of "repeat players" emerge, serving
159. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41, at 943-61.
160. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 299 (excerpts from the proceedings of the
Institute on Federal Rules of the American Bar Association, held with cooperation
from the School of Law of Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio).
161. That committee, formed in 1937, was chaired by Joseph A. Moynihan and
issued an enthusiastic report on the future of pre-trial procedure in 1938. 1938 ABA
Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 534-50.
162. See, e.g., Judical Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78. In 1955,
the ABA committee (then chaired by Judge Clarence L. Kincaid) published and dis-
tributed A JUDGE'S HANDBOOK OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE which included suggestions
on the conduct of pre-trial conferences, forms for pre-trial orders, and transcripts of
pre-trial conferences. A JUDGE'S HANDBOOK OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE, 17 F.R.D. 437
(1955).
163. For example, the symposium in which this essay sits illustrates the shared
roles of the ABA and of law schools. Here, the University of Alabama serves as
host, co-convener, and publisher of the results.
164. The relationship between West Publishing Company and the federal judiciary
has become a source of controversy. See Sharon Schmickle & Tom Hamburger, Who
Owns the Law?, MINN. STAR TRIB. Mar. 5, 1995, at 1A (reporting that judges took
trips at West's expense). West Publishing has also provided funds for NYU's Insti-
tute for Judicial Administration's appellate judges seminars. See KLEIN, supra note
137, at 89.
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on ABA committees, federal judicial committees, and lecturing,
going to and hosting conferences at which they reiterate their
commitments to judicial control over the pretrial phase and to a
managerial mode. The judges who were the speakers are the
same ones who served as leaders of new judicial institutions
such as the FJC and as members of committees of the Judicial
Conference and the ABA. In their work, these judges urged their
colleagues to change their understandings of the practice of
judging. Through these series of "clinics," "institutes," meetings,
"demonstrations," seminars and symposia, the messages of a
new gospel on judging were reiterated and spread.
The effectiveness of the mixture of local practices,
rulemaking, and judicial education is underscored by Benjamin
Kaplan, who in one of the early (1961) seminars (on "Procedures
for Effective Judicial Administration")165 understood the signif-
icance of the changes underway. Attending in his capacity as the
newly-appointed reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Kaplan
summarized the proceedings by noting that:
there is unanimity of feeling that the pretrial conference is a vital
and necessary part of the pretrial proceedings in civil causes ....
It is definitely on the move. It is becoming a most important fea-
ture of the proceedings prior to trial, and in certain judicial dis-
tricts it has already established itself as a dominating element in
those proceedings.166
He accurately forecast that some would urge the rulemakers to
make the Rule "mandatory in all or most cases. . . [and to]
prescribe detail" as well as "sanctions."167
c. Management as a Moment of Contact Between
Attorneys and Judges
Judicial leaders' affection for pretrial management is one
165. Remarks of Professor Benjamin Kaplan, in Proceedings of the Seminar on
Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 462 (1961).
166. [d. at 462.
167. [d. at 463, counseling at least hesitation and invoking the comments of
Professor Maurice Rosenberg about misuse of judicial time, of Judge Clark about the
use of Rule 16 to reintroduce special pleading rules, and of Judge William Smith
about the need for cooperation.
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source of the transformation of process; lawyers' interest in it is
another. Several researchers have reported that lawyers "like"
pretrial management; my interest is in understanding why.
A 1944 description of pre-trial conferences, offered by the
Detroit judge (Joseph A. Moynihan) who also chaired the ABA
Committee on Pre-trial, spoke of the informality; at pre-trials,
judges and lawyers "talked about the ball game and the weath-
er" while smoking cigarettes and cigars.l68 In 1950, Harry
Nims called pre-trials "simple straightforward discussion be-
tween lawyers and the judge."169 In the late 1950s, lawyers at
a conference about the pre-trial process argued that an "intangi-
ble benefit" of pre-trials was that the practice "opened up a new
relationship between the trial lawyer and the trial COurt."170
More recent reports and data echo the theme of pre-trial
conferences and judicial management as enabling contact be-
tween lawyers and judges. In 1980, when reporting data on
lawyers' opinion of civil discovery, Wayne Brazil (then a re-
searcher for the American Bar Foundation and now a magistrate
judge) described attorneys' frustration with judicial inactivity
around discovery.l7l Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Brazil ar-
gued for "firm judicial control ... [over] the pretrial develop-
ment of big cases."172 In 1983, Brazil surveyed lawyers within
his district and learned that ninety percent "prefer[red] a settle-
ment judge who actively offers suggestions and observations [to]
168. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 48.
169. NIMS, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, at 199.
170. Roy F. Shields, Advantages to a Trial Lawyer of a Pre-trial Conference, 23
F.R.D. 342, 347 (1958).
171. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Law-
yers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 245-51
[hereinafter Brazil, Views from the Front Lines]. Brazil noted that lawyers cited
judges' negative attitudes, limited resources, and reluctance to impose sanctions as
three critical causes of judicial ineffectiveness. Id. at 248. In response to the survey
question "Do you feel that you get adequate and efficient help from the courts in
resolving discovery disputes and problems," 69 percent of respondents answered neg-
atively. That figure rose to 93 percent among those he described as big case litiga-
tors. Id. at 247.
172. Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development
of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 873, 890. Brazil describes the increase in support for the proposition
that "firm judicial control is an absolutely essential element of any serious effort to
improve the efficiency and fairness of the pretrial development of big cases." Id. at
890.
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one who simply facilitates communication."173 In short, the
claim is that lawyers like judges who manage and who attempt
to bring about settlement.174 Those findings are reiterated in
the 1996 RAND report on the CJRA, which reported that "a
higher degree of case management is associated with higher
lawyer satisfaction"175 and in discussions of the report by the
Judicial Conference itself.176
Why do lawyers like case management? It is one of the few
arenas in which attorneys have an opportunity to meet with
judges-an activity enjoyed by some lawyers in and of itself, and
surely an activity that is useful for lawyers in their relation-
ship[s] with their clients. In the current litigation regime, in
which fewer than four percent of the civil docket conclude by
commencement of trialsl77 and many of the adjudicated mo-
173. Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs:
Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten
Important Values, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 303, 309 (emphasis ·omitted). These data
come from a larger study, involving four districts, in which Brazil found some re-
gional variations, as well as differences between plaintiff and defense lawyers. See
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETl'LING CML SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE
RoLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES, at 137-43 (1985), and
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETrLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAw-
YERS AND JUDGES, at 435-445 (1988) [hereinafter SETl'LING CIVIL SUITS]. For exam-
ple, lawyers from California (the state in which Brazil presides as a magistrate
judge) were more enthusiastic about judicial engagement in settlement conferences
than those from Florida. Id. at 436. Plaintiffs' attorneys distinguished themselves
from defense attorneys, particularly on the issue of judicial intervention to preclude
a party from accepting a settlement that the judge believed to be insufficient. [d. at
438.
174. See Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management under the Amended Rules:
Too Many Words for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137, 157 (1994) (praising manage-
ment but criticizing the increasing "particularism" of the rule).
175. RAND's EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at
xxxii, 55. Both RAND and the Judicial Conference also concluded that the CJRA's
creation of local advisory groups has engendered additional contact between judges
and attorneys and that such contact is beneficial. See RAND's IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CJRA, supra note 57, at xvi, 24, 26. See also Robel, Local Advisory Groups,
supra note 56, at 897-99 (discussing tensions when judges did not implement Adviso-
ry Group recommendations).
176. See 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (discuss-
ing the FJC's report in which many attorneys approved of case management practic-
es as "helpful in moving their cases along"); id. at 19, 21 (discussing the utility of
advisory groups as a means of education and contact between bench and bar).
177. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES
FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 36 tbl.C-4 (Dec. 31, 1995) (reporting that 3.2 percent of
civil cases reached trial). The relationship between judicial settlement efforts and the
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tions are determined "on the papers," lawyers described as "liti-
gators" (to be distinguished from lawyers who are "trial law-
yers") still want to "go to court." Judicial management provides
one route.178 Further, in a world in which "incivility" is de-
scribed as a central quality of litigation, lawyers want judges to
hear their claims of inappropriate adversarial behavior and
hopefully to chill ifnot sanction those excesses.179
Lawyers not only want help when dealing with opponents
but also want guidance for their own lawyering and assistance
in their interactions with clients. Again, according to research by
declining rate of trial is the subject of debate; given the many variables that affect
decisions to settle, it is difficult to determine what role judicial activism plays in the
declining trial rate. From current data, we know that a large percentage of disposi-
tions occur "without any court action" or before issue is joined. See RAND's EvALUA-
TION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 142-43 tbI. C.B (Civil Case
Point of Disposition) (57.5 percent disposed of in these ways).
It is more difficult to ascertain what role, if any, judges took before the 1938
rules. According to the AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS: PART II, CIVIL CASES (1934), which studied dispositions in 13
districts (of the then 84), about 30 percent of the federal docket "at law" concluded
by a court decision. Id. at 265. Settlement rates varied widely among the districts.
"Voluntary dismissals, discontinuance, withdrawal or nonsuit" represented on average
about 43 percent of the dispositions at law, with a high of 64 percent in the North-
ern District of Ohio and a low of 7.3 percent in the District of Massachusetts. Id. at
129, tbI. 17. In those districts, however, disposition might also occur under a catego-
ry described as "judgment by stipulation, consent, confession or compromise," and
while the overall average was 9 percent, the districts with the higher "voluntary
settlement" rates have lower "judgments by stipulation," suggesting the possibility
that procedural requirements sorted cases among the two categories. Id. at 65, 129.
If those categories fairly represent the "settlement" activity, then settlements consti-
tuted more than fifty percent of the docket. See also Charles E. Clark & James W.
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, II. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291,
1294 (1935) (describing the ALI data as evidence that "the great majority of the
cases are terminated before trial is reached").
178. "illncreased magistrate judge activity on civil cases is a strong and statis-
tically significant predictor of greater attorney satisfaction . . . . [O]ne reason . . . is
that [attorneys] find [magistrate judges] more accessible than district judges."
RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxviii.
RAND also recommended increased reliance on magistrate judges. Id. at xxviii.
179. See Thomas E. Willging, John Shapard, Donna Stienstra, & Dean Miletich,
Discovery and Disclosure Practice, Problems, and Proposals for Change: A Case-Based
National Survey of Counsel in Closed Federal Civil Cases 41-45 (FJC, 1997)
[hereinafter FJC Discovery and Disclosure Practice Survey] (reporting that 54 percent
of the attorneys surveyed thought that judicial involvement in discovery disputes
would be useful to reduce expenses, and 47 percent believed that judicial case man-
agement would reduce discovery problems) (on file with author; my thanks to Prof.
Tom Rowe for his assistance in obtaining these materials).
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Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, many attorneys want judges to
raise the topic of settlement180 and then to give advice, ~to ex-
press an opinion, to comment specifically on the strengths or
weaknesses of evidence or arguments, or to evaluate a case.»181
Brazil argues further that the judicial contribution to the merits
of settlement discussions stems from judges' work as judges;
"[j]udges . . . are paid to make decisions,» and he proposes, are
valued for their "skill in judging.»182 Thus, judicial case man-
agement may assuage attorneys' own anxieties about how to
prepare cases and what advice to provide clients. We also know
that attorneys use judges in their dealings with their own cli-
ents. Researchers report lawyers frequently invoke (albeit not
always accuratelyl83) judicial opinions on the value of a case.
Attorneys report that judicial views on the reasonableness of a
settlement have significant effects on "balking client[s].»184 .
Finally, lawyers use judicial case management as one place
in which to advocate to judges. They want to persuade judges of
the validity of their positions, and case management is a strate-
gic occasion upon which to advance a client's cause.
Judges, in turn, like aspects of the pre-trial management
process. In contrast to attorneys who may see it as an advocate's
avenue, judges see it as a moment in which lawyers can be con-
strained. The rule revisions of the 1980s were explicit in their
interest in constraining attorneys. As Arthur Miller explained in
an FJC publication about the 1983 amendments, a major theme
was "somehow to try and engineer improved or increased lawyer
responsibility, to moderate lawyer behavior in litigation so that
180. A good deal of literature suggests that proposing the possibility of a settle-
ment is a sign of weakness. See, e.g., BRAZIL, SETl'LING CIVIL SUITS, supra note 173,
at 45.
181. Wayne D. Brazil, What Do Lawyers Expect from Judges?, 21 TRIAL 69, 69
(Sept. 1985) (summarizing his research reported in the book SETl'LING CIVIL SUITS).
182. BRAZIL, SETl'LING CML SUITS, supra note 173, at 45.
183. See, e.g,. William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Ne-
gotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447, 1463 (1992) (describing attorneys who offer clients "a form of cynical
realism through which the legal system and its actors are trashed • . . frequently in
an exaggerated fashion").
184. BRAZIL, SETl'LING CIVIL SUITS, supra note 173, at 101-02. See also Felstiner
& Sarat, supra note 183, at 1462-65 (describing a series of techniques lawyers use
to persuade their clients, including attorneys' knowledge of legal rules and their esti-
mates of what judges will do).
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there is less of the aimless, less of the pavlovian, less of the
drifting."185 Judicial management is the means/86 and many
judges believe that they are good at it, reaping results both in
terms of cheaper process and of quicker dispositions.187
Of course, that attorneys and judges respond positively to
access to judges during the pretrial phase is insufficient to vali-
date it as an appropriate process; issues remain about the pro-
priety or fairness of case management as well as its utility. A
few commentators have suggested that limitations on the inter-
actions are appropriate; for example, Professor David Shapiro
proposed a presumption that, "in the absence of informed con-
sent by the parties, a judge who has become significantly in-
volved in settlement discussions should not ordinarily preside
over the adjudication of issues on the merits ...."186 Empirical
reports also inform us of litigant distress at attorney-judge set-
tlement conferences in which the parties are absent.189
Another question is about the efficacy of case management.
RAND reports that early "judicial case management" may save
time, but only at the price of "significantly increased lawyer
work hours."190 RAND further concludes that to maximize effi-
185. Arthur R. Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility 10 (FJC,
1984) (based on remarks made at an FJC workshop).
186. As Professor Miller put it, "what has been done to rule 16 . . • is that it
has been transformed. The old rule 16 is gone and what you now have in rule 16 is
a blueprint for management." Id. at 20.
187. Hence, one fmds both surprise and hesitancy in embracing RAND's findings.
See, e.g., Rex Bossert, Case Management Gets Judicial Nod; RAND ADR Study Fails
to Deter Judges, Who Say More Experiment Is Warranted, NAT'L L.J. June 9, 1996,
at All; Darryl Van Duch & Marcia Coyle, Start Over on Case Management Reform?,
NAT'L L.J. Feb. 10, 1997, at A6.
188. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16, supra note 75, at 1996 (arguing against a flat
prohibition); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 426-
32 (1982) (discussing the risk of premature judgment). The assumption, according to
one ABA committee, in state court practice in the 1930s was that the judge who did
the pre-trial would not conduct the trial. 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report,
supra note 80, at 538.
189. E. ALLAN LIND, ROBERT J. MACCOUN, PATRICIA A. EBENER, WILIAM L. F.
FELSTINER, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, JUDITH RESNIK & TOM R. TYLER, THE PERCEPrION
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNExED ARBITRATION, AND Ju-
DICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 44-79 (RAND, 1989).
190. RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxiii
55. In her comments at the University of Alabama CJRA Implementation Conference
and then at a FJC training seminar for district judges, Professor Lauren Robel sug-
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cacy, management must be coupled with enforcement of dead-
lines, including shortening discovery periods and insisting on
trial dates/91 which might be understood as proposing less ju-
dicial management and more court-based cut-oft's. Judges might
respond (indeed have, in a fashion, via the Judicial Conference
report on the CJRA and RAND's findings192) that the "close-up
view"193 has use because judges provide needed guidance for
inept lawyers, focus for overspending lawyers, and control of
misbehaving lawyers.
These points about the fairness and utility of case manage-
ment are relevant to the ongoing use of managerial processes,
and I will return to them below; the point here is to underscore
that judicial promotion of pretrial management finds a receptive
ear in lawyers, eager to have a chance to "go to court."
3. The Results of Four Decades of Changes.-By individual
practices (carried over from state courts and appearing particu-
larly useful in large-scale litigation), through articulation (by
local rules, in committee reports, and repeated under the aegis
of judicial education), and through support from attorneys (in
search of an open court house door), the "pre-trial" moved from a
predicate to trial to a stage unto itself, an activity focused on
disposition without trial. Some of the terms have changed; we no
longer hear about "iron hearted judges" or "protracted cases" but
rather about "managerial judges" and "complex cases." Some
new terms-such as "differential case management" (nCM or
tracking) and "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR)-have been
added, but the framework (once detailed for the rare "protract-
ed" casel94) has become accepted as appropriate in the ordinary
case.
gested that judges should think of case management as imposing costs on clients
and then determine how much management is appropriate to do.
191. RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at
xxxiii.
192. See 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-32 (dis-
cussing a list of recommendations involving judicial management including setting
limits on discovery, the filing of motions, and time limits to trial).
193. Shields, supra note 170, at 347.
194. See supra note 100, and accompanying text.
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The second chart provides a snapshot of the distance trav-
eled. I have there marked the late 1950s and early 1960s as a
useful stop along the way. One way to appreciate the change in
the gestalt is to consider an essay written in 1958 by Professors
Benjamin Kaplan and Arthur Mehren of the Harvard Law
School, joined by Judge Rudolf Schaefer of the Hamburg
Amtsgericht.195 They had just returned from a trip to Germany,
and they wrote about what they learned for their United States
audience, comprised ofjudges and lawyers.
Basically Kaplan et al. reported on the news from abroad:
that is, they described behavior of German judges that looked
quite foreign from the perspective of the United States. As they
put it, the German judge was
constantly descending to the level of the litigants, as an examin-
er, patient or hectoring, as counselor and advisor, [and] as insis-
tent promoter of settlements.l96
While at the time these foreign judges were just that, "for-
eign" in their behavior as compared to what was expected of
United States judges,197 today the words that Kaplan used to
195. Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur Von Vehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German
Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71" HARv. L. REV. 1193 (1958).
196. Kaplan et al., pt. 1, at 1472.
197. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 188, at 382-86 (describing expec-
tations in the United States in the 1930s-1960s that judges not engage in settlement
promotion); see also Nims, Some By-Products of Pre-Trial, supra note 89, at 188
(describing "bitter criticism from lawyers and judges in New York and elsewhere"
when in 1949, judges in Brooklyn and New York called conferences specifically "[to]
helpD the parties to end" cases without trial, and the then-more recent "spreading"
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describe German judges capture the role of the United States
managerial judge, who is also an "insistent promoter of
settlement."198 Since the 1960s and 1980s, federal judges have
been taught-taught by each other in conferences before the
creation of the FJC and then by the FJC as it trains new judges,
by local rules and practice, by state court practices, by col-
leagues, by seminars at law schools, by their own prior experi-
ences as lawyers in the federal courts, and then by a national
rule regime-taught by all these sources to exercise their discre-
tion to manage cases, to try to control attorneys, to try to get
control over discovery, to urge ADR, to bring up the question of
settlement and to function as "settlement judges."199
In sum, there has been a change, significant and substan-
tial, in the federal civil docket in terms of the relationship be-
tween judges and lawyers, in terms of the daily processes of
litigation, in terms of what federal district judges take to be
their job, and in terms of the goals of the process.2OO The 1938
Rules provided a vague category called the pre-trial and left it
utterly to the discretion of the district judge as to whether it
would be filled and if so, how. The 1990s find the mandate that
judicial involvement with lawyers begin soon after the filing of
lawsuits and continue through conclusion. The change is not,
however, a change that occurred between 1990 and 1994 but one
that has been underway since the 1950s and which is still in
process today.
of judicial settlement efforts).
198. The point is not to equate German judges and United States judges but
rather that descriptions of a particular posture, seen as unique then, are no longer
understood as outside the conception of what United States judges might be about.
See, e.g., John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L.
REv. 823, 858-866 (1985).
199. This term appears in the Eastern District of New York's CJRA plan. See
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, 1991 WL 525112, at *12; Janet Cooper Alexan-
der, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 647 (1994); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promo-
tion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994).
200. For an argument that judges have also changed in their stance toward leg-
islation and have, in the past few decades, become much more involved in lawmak-
ing, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996). For discus-
sion of changes in appellate practices, see the Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Appellate
Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas, The Fairchild Lecture, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 9.
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Thus it is not surprising that RAND found little difference
over a four year time span in costs, time to disposition, the
views of lawyers and judges,201 in the amount of time "judicial
officers" invested per case,202 or in judicial perceptions of their
role in managing cases.203 Both the CJRA and recent revisions
by the judiciary of Rule 16 are instances in which statutes and
rules codifY practices rather than invent them. This is not to say
that after the codification represented by the CJRA, no change
occurred but rather that codification is a marker rather than the
point of departure.204 Hence, one would expect, as RAND
found, some evidence of new programs or greater use of pro-
grams already extant, specifically an increase in the fraction of
cases managed.205
B. Migratory Procedure: From Case Management
to Lawyer Management
Given this first conclusion (that national rulemaking-be it
from Congress or from the federal judiciary-frequently repre-
sents codification of practice), a second, related point (again,
reflected in RAND's findings) is about the basis for rulemaking.
201. RAND's EvALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 22 (suggesting that
the finding of little effect from the enactment of the CJRA can be explained by
several reasons, including that some districts did not alter their practices after the
legislation, that those districts that did make alterations applied those rules to only
a small number of cases, that those changes that were more widely implemented
had relatively little effect on time, cost, and perceptions of fairness, and that varia-
tion among individual judges limited implementation efforts).
202. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 24; RAND's EVALUA-
TION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 249·50. The study included
time spent by magistrate and district judges per case but not special masters, medi-
ators, arbitrators. [d. at 244.
203. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 24 (85·92 percent of
the judges responded "no difference"); RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MAN-
AGEMENT, supra note 57, at 84-85. According to the FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
REPORT, supra note 62, at 38, one judge said "[w]e've only renamed what we've been
doing." Similarly, in the Northern District of Ohio, advisory group members reported
that a differential case management program predated the CJRA. [d. at 87. Not all
agreed, however, that the CJRA worked no change; for example, in the Western Dis-
trict of Michigan, the majority of judges reported substantial changes stemming from
the CJRA. [d. at 51.
204. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 17.
205. [d. at 10.
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Rulemakers write with cases in mind, with paradigms of the
problems or events to which rulemaking is addressed.206 Be
they judicial or congressional, rulemakers generalize from their
experiences. In recent years, those experiences are
disproportionately in "big" cases. Below, I detail why and how
these cases are so dominant and then some of the consequences
when rulemaking, based on the "big" case, migrates and is ap-
plied to other kinds of cases. My purposes here are (again) to
understand what RAND found about the CJRA and at what else
RAND might have looked.
From a host of social science work, we know that small
cases are typically resolved without judicial involvement.207 In
their daily work, judges see only a fraction of the caseload, those
pulled to their attention by means of pre-trial discovery dis-
putes, requests for adjudication such as motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment, and trials. (Judges also used to see a dis-
proportionate amount of prisoner litigation, in part because
those cases are lawyer-less and hence without gatekeepers or
advocates.208) Given a declining rate of trials in civil litigation
in federal COurt,209 discovery and motion practice become im-
portant means by which cases come before the judiciary (includ-
ing both district court and magistrate judges).
While discovery had been a practice celebrated from its
inception in the 1930s through the 1960s,210 claims of difficulty
206. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
Cm. L. REV. 494, 508-15 (1986).
207. David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L. F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer,
& Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 83-84
(1983) (based on empirical research, the Civil Justice Litigation Project found, "[t]he
typical case is procedurally simple and will be settled voluntarily without a verdict
or judgment on the merits").
208. Judges see fewer of these cases because of practices of delegation of them to
magistrate judges (see CARROLL SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE
STUDIES (1985» and of federal legislation limiting prisoner access. See the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 803 (requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies); Prison Litigation Reform Act § 804,
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (requiring that prisoners, attempting to file in forma
pauperis, pay funds from trust accounts, if any, and precluding filings in excess of
three under certain conditions).
209. Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 73, at 633-39 (describing
the decline over a fifty year period, from 15.4 percent in 1940 to 4.3 percent in
1990).
210. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Columbia Project for Effective Justice, Field
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with discovery emerged early on in the "big case."211 More gen-
eralized cries of "discovery abuse" come to the fore in the late
1970s, again many of them in reference to the "big case."212 Ba-
sically, data on discovery-then and now-are that the majority
of cases do not involve discovery disputes;213 large-scale litiga-
tion does.214 Similarly, problems associated with large-scale lit-
Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery, Report to the Aduisory Committee on Rules of
Ciuil Procedure at 3 (Discussion draft, Feb. 1965) (at the request of the Advisory
Committee, research on discovery found that "there are not any widespread or pro-
found failings in the present scope or availability of discovery"); Maurice Rosenberg,
Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discouery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 488 (1968) (describing
findings as demonstrating that while discovery works well, it does "not appear to
save substantial court time" and should not be understood as an "efficiency-promot-
ing device"). See also the 1951 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE, supra note 78, at 104-05 (discussing which forms of discovery were
"popular").
211. See, e.g., Richard W. McLaren, Procedure in Priuate Antitrust Cases, in Sem-
inar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395, 440, 445-48 (1957) (discovery problems in
anti-trust litigation); Hon. John W. Murphy, Summary and Resolutions, 21 F.R.D.
395, 519-520 (1957) ("Control of discovery is desirable and may properly be exercised
by the judge."). See also Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal
Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 125-26 (1949) (relying on interviews with judges, lawyers,
and stenographic reporters and concluding that, while in the "majority of cases" no
abuse occurs, those involving "complex litigation" do entail abuse because the "re-
sources of time, money and counsel make it practicable as a litigation tactic").
212. See Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discouery Abuse in Ciuil
Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REv. 579 (describing the criticism and
arguing that two premises of the rules, unlinlited access and the assumption of
judicial involvement as exceptional, should be revised).
213. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN, & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (1978) (in 52
percent of the cases studied, no discovery requests existed on file: in those with
requests for discovery, the median number of requests was three). More recent data
comes from work by the FJC, who at the request of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, sent questionnaires to 2,016 attorneys in 1000 cases and, based on a
response rate of 59 percent, reported that 94 percent engaged in what they termed
"formal discovery," and that 48 percent reported some discovery problems; FJC Dis-
couery and Disclosure Practice Suruey, supra note 179, at 10-21. See also Judith A.
McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Ciuil Discouery (paper pre-
pared through the FJC for the 1997 Advisory Committee meetings) (summarizing the
literature on discovery and analyzing its limitations) (on file with author): NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF Omo DCM STUDY, supra note 60, at 21-23 (problems of unduly expen-
sive litigation, including discovery abuse, are likely related with a subset of the
docket).
214. See Brazil, Views from the Frontlines, supra note 171, at 222-35 (dividing
civil discovery into two "subworlds," one of large cases and the other of small cases);
FJC Discouery and Disclosure Practice Suruey, supra note 179, at 2, 19-21 (reporting
that attorneys attributed four percent of the total litigation attorney expenses per
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igation have become one basis for arguments in favor of alterna-
tive dispute resolution.215
It is not only judges who "know" about pre-trial litigation in
civil cases by means of the big case; the same is true of the law-
yers who serve on the rule and bar committees involved in
rulemaking. Lawyers who work on large-scale litigation have the
economic wherewithal (and sometimes self-interest) to sustain
involvement in the rulemaking process.216 These lawyers and
judges have common reference points, share experiences and,
over the past decades, share perceptions of the waste and ex-
pense of practices that they are in a position to see. In short, the
"big case" forms the basis of a good deal of the experiences and
understanding of the set of lawyers and judges who make rules
about civil litigation.
What do such judges and lawyers "know" when they contem-
plate large litigation? They know of problems, of the need for
judicial control, of attorney misbehavior. Over the years, judges
and lawyers generalized that the rules they were developing in
what I will call "context A" (such as securities and anti-trust)
would benefit "context B" (the general civil docket). Over time,
the discretionary approach of the 1938 Rule 16 (in essence, pro-
viding that whatever pretrial process occurred was within the
unfettered discretion of the district court) was replaced first
informally by judges urging their colleagues to shift toward a
managerial, discovery-controlling, settlement-oriented re-
gime,217 and then formally by a rule that mandated judicial in-
volvement.218
The concept of judicial control, argued as essential for the
client to "unnecessary discovery expenses" and concluding that the problems with
discovery stem not from the forms of discovery but the type of case; that "complex,"
"contentious," "high-stakes," and "high-volume cases" present problems).
215. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 'rEx. L. REV.
1587, 1590-91 (1995).
216. The classic essay is that by Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
217. See, e.g., Robert Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Wil-
liam Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE
400 (1978).
218. The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 state this mandate. See FED. R. CIV. P.
16, as amended in 1983 and then in 1993.
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big case and in discovery disputes, was then generalized as use-
ful in ordinary litigation. I detailed earlier what the 1950s
Handbook on Protracted Litigation included219 to demonstrate
how that which was specially crafted in the 1950s to apply to
the unusual lawsuit has become familiar in the 1990s to judges
and lawyers as steps to be taken in most cases. Further, while
state use of a pre-trial had relied on different judges for that
phase than for trial,220 the Handbook argued the need for a
single judge to control the case throughout its life, and that has
become the current federal practice. Procedures crafted with one
kind of case in mind have migrated to almost the whole
docket.221
What flows from the use of experience with large cases to
make rules for most cases? The problem, of course, is that as-
sumptions fairly-based in experiences with one set of cases may
not be apt in other kinds of civil litigation. One might make the
wrong rules for cases that are not the basis from which the
initial rule regime is built and find oneself faced with unexpect-
ed and unintended consequences.
The image of transferring rules that are plausible in one set
of cases to another set helps explain what RAND found about
how management can increase costs. In large-scale litigation,
lawyers spend lots of time with and before judges. Judges in
turn have focused on reining in those lawyers, already present
and consuming court and client resources. What we call "case
management" is really an effort to manage lawyers, not cases.
Further support for the translation of "case management"
into "lawyer management" comes from the specific decision to
leave unregulated a group of cases that RAND called "minimal
219. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
220. See 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 538.
221. In another paper, I noted this spillover effect. See Judith Resnik, Procedural
Innovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A
Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1627 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedural Innovations].
See also Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex
Litigation: A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small
Federal Cases, 14 REv. LITIG. 113 (1994) (arguing that the federal rules are well de-
signed for more complex cases but that other rules should be developed for "small
cases" and pointing to "[s]pecial small claims rules" as a "near-universal feature of
state civil practice"). [d. at 131.
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management cases," described as lawsuits involving prisoners,
social security, bankruptcy appeals, foreclosure, forfeiture and
penalties, and debt recovery.222 The absence of judicial man-
agement for such sets of cases is not novel with the CJRA; the
practice is continuous with that under Rule 16, as revised in
1983.223 That these cases are not managed underscores that
the goal of management is superintendence of attorneys, not cas-
es. If case management were at the central concern, provisions
for litigants in need of assistance might be prominent, but the
innovations of the last decades have not been to equip these liti-
gants-to use the offices of the court to bring assistance to
them-but rather for judges to work on cases in which litigants
have lawyers. (Some might respond that many of these "minimal
management cases" are not worth judicial assistance because
they are either of very little economic value and/or pose few
legal questions and should not be before the Article III judiciary
at all.224)
The exclusion of certain cases from the management regime
makes plain the focus on lawyers. Yet experiences with lawyers
in big cases do not provide great insight into lawyer behavior in
ordinary cases, in which judges and lawyers had not been so
entangled. Judicial management is an effort to insist on attorney
investment in litigation, and specifically, that attorneys spend
time with each other and with judges in the pretrial process.
Unlike the large-scale cases, in which lawyers were already
front and center, in the middling range of cases, lawyers might
not-but for judicial management-undertake certain kinds of
activities, such as taking depositions before a discovery cut-off or
222. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 7 n.3, 11-12 (find-
ing that these cases remain untouched by the management regime of the CJRA).
223. Social security and prisoner litigation are cases offered in the Advisory
Notes to the 1983 Rule as examples of ones that might be exempt from the man-
datory pretrial process. See FED. R. Cw. P. 16(b) advisory committee's note (1983).
Note that Professor Robel also found that under the exemption category were an
array of cases broader than those listed here, and further argued that· any such
exemptions should not be left to district court discretion but should be uniform na-
tionally. See Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search
of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 49, 52-55 (1994).
224. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM1TI'EE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM1TI'EE 55·60; 48·50 (Apr. 2, 1990) (proposals to move social
security cases to an administrative system and to increase dispute resolution mecha-
nisms other than the federal courts for prisoner litigation).
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preparing for conferences.225 When transposed to other cases,
judicial management (that potentially economizes in the large-
scale context) requires greater investment of lawyer hours.226
When managing lawyers, judges sit as "super senior partners"
attempting to oversee attorneys' products. What RAND's work
nicely reminds us is that lawyers (at least those paid on an
hourly basis) have the ability to pass on the costs of manage-
ment to their clients.227 As a result, the very "reforms" ad-
vanced on the grounds that they would save money end up
costing money.228
Hence, the CJRA should serve as a caution against the
practice of generic rulemaking based on a narrow band of infor-
mation and experience. RAND's report is thus supportive of
commentators who call for more and better empiricism to inform
the rulemaking process in general.229 But the empiricism pro-
225. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 14 (management
and discovery cutoffs push lawyers to do work that might not occur without those
provisions and thus both increase costs).
226. While management compelled more attorney work (see RAND's EVALUATION
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxiii-xxiv), judges reported to
RAND that it did not, however, take them more time. Id. at 84. That finding fits
with reports that, before and after the act, judicial time investment remained rela-
tively stable. Id. at 24.
227. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 188, at 422-23 (managerial judg-
ing, if imposed across all kinds of cases, requires attorneys to invest time, including
in some cases that would have been disposed of without that work).
228. When RAND's findings are coupled with the recent experiences of revisions
of Rule 11, a possible conclusion is that judges are clumsy actors when asked to
oversee attorneys and that the structural position in which judges sit makes it un-
likely that they can do much other than give attorneys excuses to "keep the meter
running." The initial expansion of Rule 11 in 1983 was borne of an impulse parallel
to that found in the CJRA and in Rule 16: judicial superintendence of attorneys,
and specifically, their misbehavior. However laudatory the goal, the means-judges
watching over lawyers-proved cumbersome, time consumptive, and imprecise. The
task spawned (in the Rule 11 context) "satellite litigation," and in relatively short
order, Rule 11 was revised again in an effort to pull back from what came to be
understood as needless and/or ineffective efforts by judges to control attorneys. See
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, FED. R. CN. P. 11 (amended 1993), 146 F.R.D.
401, 419 (1993); John Frank, Bench-Bar Proposal to Rellise Cillil Procedure Rule 11,
137 F.R.D. 159 (1991). Note that Congress modified the Rule 11 process in the 1995
securities legislation, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (Supp. 1995), to impose greater oversight
of attorneys in that category of cases.
229. See, e.g., Laurens Walker, A Comprehensille Reform for Cillil Rulemaking, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455 (1993) (urging empirical testing of proposed rules); Laurens
Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Cillil Rule Making: The Role of Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994); cf. Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in
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vided there also needs revisiting. If the data were disaggregated
by kind of case, would the results be the same? Would cost sav-
ings be found in the subset of cases for which these rules were
initially designed?
c. The Durability ofDiscretion
One reading of RAND's report is that, at least in the time
frame studied and without disaggregation of the data, judicial
discretionary control of the pre-trial docket and the various
management techniques do not, in and of themselves, achieve
the congressional goals of cost savings. (RAND's recommenda-
tion is that, to save money, judges need modify their practices
and set discovery and trial deadlines.230) Further, RAND's
evaluation of six alternative dispute programs provides little
support for their use as means to reduce time to disposition or
costs to litigants.231 In other words, just like the change from
the twelve to the six person jury, the new rule regime is subject
to question about at least its claims of economy, if not its wis-
dom. One might then assume that RAND's findings would lead
to some calls for revision of these rules.
Thus far, little evidence of that response exists. The Judicial
Conference's formal response, issued in May of 1997 as required
by Congress, continues to express commitment to judicial discre-
tionary control; most of its recommendations relate to techniques
to control attorney behavior, and few address limitations on'
judicial behavior.232 Further, at the Alabama conference for
Procedural Rule Making: Comment on Walker, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 595 (1994) (offer~
ing a cautionary note); Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note
41, (urging a reduction in rule revision in general).
230. RAND's EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at
xxxiii. RAND explains, "the combined effects of early management, setting the trial
schedule early, and reducing time to discovery cut-off tend to offset their respective
effects on lawyer work hours." Id. at 90.
231. RAND'S EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND ENE, supra note 57, at xxx-xxxv.
232. 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-3, 5-7. In a
summary of its recommendations, the Conference included a few mandates, such as
consideration of whether FED. R. CIV. P. 16 should be amended to "require a judicial
officer to set the date of trial to occur within a certain time." Id. at 3. Otherwise,
the Conference called for continued use of case management and a good deal of local
decisions, including that "individual districts continue to determine on a local basis
whether the nature of their caseload calls for the track model or the judicial discre-
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which this essay was written and in other materials, providers
of alternative dispute resolution questioned RAND's data, in-
voked aspects of the FJC's Report as supportive of their work,
and affirmed the utility of ADR and of case management.233
In that discussion, the rationale for the CJRA shifts; no
longer are cost and delay the central justifications but rather the
processes themselves are claimed to be useful, offering intrinsic
utility because they provide for more dialogue, for better and
more just (if not less expensive) decisionmaking.234 The argu-
ment is that Congress and the federal judiciary properly in-
stalled a regime of judicial management of lawyers, and that
RAND's limited congressional charter did not reveal how the
additional investment of lawyer time was useful. The argument
runs further that, rather than focus on cost and money, RAND
should have considered either litigant satisfaction or the better,
more generative remedies produced by case management and
ADR.
Assessing these claims is difficult. Given the problems
RAND encountered in obtaining data from litigants,235 we do
tion model for their differentiated case management (DCM) systems." Id. at 5.
233. See News Release, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, ADR Group Cau-
tions Against Developing Policy Based on RAND Institute's ADR Study (Mar. 14,
1997); Judges, Scholars Oppose Rand Findings, THE METRoPOLITAN CORPORATE
COUNSEL, May, 1997, at 24.
234. See, e.g., ADR Group Press Release, supra note 233, at 4 (arguing that well-
designed and implemented ADR programs offer "better quality solutions • • • and
may increase public confidence and satisfaction with our courts. Mixed cost and
delay data should not overshadow these important justice values."); 1997 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 ("Despite the failure to find positive
cost and delay reducing impacts, the Conference does believe that the positive attrib-
utes often associated with ADR (and reflected in the FJC demonstration data and
findings), such as increased lawyer and litigant satisfaction, argue for continued
experimentation."). See also Rex Bossert, Case Management Gets Judicial Nodi
RAND ADR Study Fails to Deter Judges Who Say More Experiment Is Warranted,
NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1997, at All (quoting the chair of one Judicial Conference Com-
mittee as expressing disappointment that the study did not "affirm our belief that
ADR reduces cost and delay"). For responses, see Janet Conley, Is ADR Living Up
to Its Promise?, AM. LAWYER (Sept. 24, 1997) (including comments by Dr. Deborah
Hensler, director of RAND's ICJ).
235. RAND attempted to obtain litigant data, but the response rates were too
low for use and much of the satisfaction and perception of fairness data come from
lawyers. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 6 (responses from
one eighth of the litigants surveyed); see also RAND's EvALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 117-19) (discussing the difficulties of sampling liti-
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not know whether judicial oversight helped lawyers provide bet-
ter services to clients or become more responsive or knowledge-
able. Because other RAND reports tell us that litigants value
process,236 we might have grounds for celebrating the proce-
dural changes of the last decades if we had information on
achievements other than those specified by Congress, which
were primarily time to disposition and litigation costS.237
The post-RAND rationales for the CJRA demonstrate the
ability to shift rationales for procedural innovations. The im-
pulse to remain committed to a rule regime ·even if it does not
appear to have accomplished the purposes for which it was first
articulated permits another conclusion about the rules of the
last decades-their durability. Further, what appears to be par-
ticularly durable is discretion; procedural changes that augment
trial court discretion in the service ofease and economy are hard
to undo.
Embedded in the pattern of change ongoing from 1938 for-
ward is a deep commitment by the federal judiciary to the dis-
cretionary authority of the district court judge over pretrial
processes.236 Here, recall the rebellion of the federal judges
against their own rulemakers when faced with a proposed man-
date of a twelve person jury.239 Not only did district judges in-
sist that they knew how to tailor, individually, the number of
jurors needed for a particular case, but they clung to that discre-
tion as if it had been part of an "hoary and time honored"240
gants, including the absence of addresses and nonresponses).
236. E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L. F.
Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik, and Tom Tyler, In the Eye of the
Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System,
24 L. & SOC'y REv. 953 (1990); Robert J. MacCoun, E. Allan Lind, & Tom R. Tyler,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and Appellate Courts, in HANDBOOK OF PSY-
CHOLOGY AND LAw 107-110 (1992); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah R.
Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 355-372 (1996).
237. See RAND's EvALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 5.
238. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41, at 942-48 (discussing
discretion as a key feature of equity practice that was transferred to the rest of the
docket in the 1930s rule revisions).
239. See supra notes 5-52 and accompanying text.
240. The phrase is used in People v. Venters, 311 N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1987) (finding that New York's practice of closing the courtroom during
delivery of the jury charge deprived a defendant of constitutional rights).
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tradition, rather than the newly-minted option (younger than 25
years) that it was.
Recall also how, when earlier drafts of the CJRA included
mandatory language,241 the federal judiciary launched an ener-
getic lobbying effort,242 resulting in the current, and deliberate-
ly "vague"243 language of the CJRA that vests discretion for
CJRA implementation with federal judges. The judiciary was
able to persuade Congress of its need for "maximum flexibility
on the part of each judge to manage his or her own case-
load."244 Thus, the 1938 Federal Rules' ideological commitment
to judicial discretion became codified in the text of the CJRA of 1990.245
241. The task force, assembled by Senator Joseph Biden and meeting at the
Brookings Institute, had recommended that "[b]y statute, [Congress should] direct all
federal district courts to develop and implement within twelve months a 'Civil Jus-
tice Reform Plan'" (JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 12), and that such plan
should include "case tracking" (id. at 14), the setting of firm discovery deadlines and
trial dates, and deviation permitted only under limited circumstances (id. at 16-21).
See also the draft of S. 2027, introduced Jan. 25, 1990, § 471(b), that provided that
"[e]ach civil justice expense and delay reduction plan shall include . . . [a] system of
differentiated case management ...." and other mandates).
242. See, e.g., CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 208-09, 218-22 (testimony and
statement of Judge Robinson urging Congress to permit additional opportunities for
judicial input and hear from Chief Judge Robert Peckham, who chaired a special
task force of the Judicial Conference on the then-proposed CJRA; stating that the
federal judiciary agreed with the principles of the CJRA but disagreed with the
"specific means" of achieving the "common goal" (id. at 220), that the bill's mandates
could have negative effects and would be "extraordinarily intrusive into the internal
workings of the Judicial Branch" (id. at 221»; see also id. at 320-32 (statement by
the Honorable Robert F. Peckham, arguing that the judiciary's changes to Rules 11,
16, and 26 addressed parallel concerns, that the Judicial Conference created a com-
mittee on "Court Administration and Management" to respond, that the proposed
legislation was spawned without assistance from judges who have attempted to re-
spond but felt pressured, and that a key point of disagreement was the effort "to in-
sist on mandating conformity with procedural principles"); and id. at 360 (statement
of the Hon. Diana E. Murphy, then President of the Federal Judges Organization,
objecting that the legislation responded as if the civil docket was not affected by
other aspects of the district court docket and was ill-advised, especially in its ab-
sence of flexibility).
243. This term is the ICJ's. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note
57, at 30 ("the vague wording of the act itself').
244. Statement of Judge Robinson, CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 224. Of
course, congressional pressure also resulted in increased judicial attention to these
issues, including its drafting of a "14 [p]oint [p]rogram," as was noted by Judge
Peckham.Ido at 397.
245. My view is not, however, that all of the ideological commitments within the
1938 rules are still shared. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While
You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155, 1158 (1994) (discussing the "sea
HeinOnline -- 49 Ala. L. Rev. 199 1997-1998
1997] Changing Practices, Changing Rules 199
Evidence of the depth ofjudicial commitment to discretion is
illustrated by one of RAND's findings, that in practice, federal
judges have generally not used the congressionally-recommended
system of what some call "differential case management" and
others term "tracking," by which cases are sorted according to
specified criteria and given differing pretrial procedures. In-
stead, RAND found that judges prefer individual "tailoring,"246
a practice consistent with the preference for discretion that
drives both the implementation of the CJRA and the language of
the act itself. Rather than work together to create uniform pre-
trial practices that create tracks describing different kinds of
process for different kinds of cases, most federal judges continue
to prefer what Charles Clark described forty years ago as the
"individualization of the case."247
Perhaps Judge Clark's phrase needs to be altered; the com-
mitment is to "individualization" of the judge. I began this essay
by describing a conference, held in 1996, at NYU about civil
juries. Reports of another conference, held in July of 1938, in
Cleveland, illuminate judges' attachment to their own individual
authority. In July of 1938, the ABA, working with another law
school (Western Reserve) held an "Institute" to discuss the then
brand-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Members of the
Civil Rules Committee explained their project to the bar, and
Professor Edson Sunderland, a major proponent of Rule 16,248
was charged with leading the discussion. After he explained the
rule, the following exchange took place:
change" that has undermined "liberality of pleading, wide-open discovery and attor-
ney latitude") [hereinafter Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedurel.
246. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 12-13 (very little evi-
dence that judges use differential case management but rather that judges tailor
"management to the needs of the case"); RAND's IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CJRA,
supra note 57, at 28-32, 45-46, 49. Judicial objections to tracking can be found in
CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 289 (questions answered by Judge Robinson in-
clude the view that to "assign cases mechanically to rigid tracks would have a detri-
mental effect" on management efforts).
247. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 164.
248. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure,
36 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1937) (arguing that civil procedure lacked a means to test
pleadings comparable to that of the preliminary hearing on the criminal side, de-
scribing the "remarkable effort" in Wayne County courts in having a compulsory
informal hearing in which attorneys appeared before judges, with the result that
some cases were disposed of and others were tried better).
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Mr. Herbert M. Bingham, (Washington, D.C.): As I read Rule 16,
it is solely discretionary and the court acts on its own volition. In
other words, neither party can file a motion for a pre-trial hear-
ing.
Mr. Sunderland: It is entirely discretionary with each district
judge. He can handle it as he sees fit.
Mr. Bingham: As a matter of curiosity, why was it made discre-
tionary?
Mr. Sunderland: Because if the district judges didn't like it, it
wouldn't work anyway. (Laughter)
Mr. Bingham: Why could it not have been mandatory?
Mr. Sunderland: There is no use in making it mandatory because
nothing will be accomplished without the sympathetic interest of
the judge, and you can't force him to be sympathetic. (Laugh-
ter).249
D. Discretion at the Expense of Uniformity
The observation that trial judges are deeply committed to
their own discretion helps to explain the proliferation of local
rulemaking, both before and after the CJRA. Uniformity is,
inevitably, in tension with the exercise of individualized discre-
tion, and thus, built into the federal rules of 1938 is a feature
that works against the aspiration ofuniformity.250
Many commentators have decried what they term the
"balkanization" of civil procedure,251 and charged Congress
with abetting disuniformity with the enactment of the
CJRA.252 But as Dean Daniel Coquillette, Stephen Subrin, and
249. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 299.
250. For discussions of different kinds of uniformity, see Stephen N. Subrin, Uni-
formity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The
Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REv. 79 (1997) [hereinafter Subrin, Unifor-
mity in Procedural Rules].
251. See, e.g.. Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Pro-
liferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1997).
252. Charles Wright argued in the 1960s that local rules were the '"soft;
underbelly' of federal procedure." See Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, 1012 n.6
(quoting a letter from Prof. Wright to the law review) and recently reiterated that
comment in Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14
REV. LITIG. 1, 10 (1994). For him, the CJRA "dashed" all hopes of progress toward
limiting local rules; "[p]rocedural anarchy is now the order of the day." [d. at 11.
See also Subrin, Teachip,g Civil Procedure, supra note 245, at 1159-60 (the CJRA as
a "blow to uniformity").
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Mary Squires documented in the Local Rules Project they under-
took in the late 1980s, local rule proliferation predates the
CJRA. By the late 1980s, more than 5000 local rules existed,
many of which were at wide variance from the national
rules.253 Professor Subrin takes us back further, to the report
of disuniformity in the early 1940s254 and to authorization for
local rule variation by "at least 39 provisions" of federal stat-
utes.255 A 1966 empirical project documented the extent at that
time, not only providing examples of variation but also of an
ongoing tradition of disloyalty to national rules,256 including
the example with which I began this essay.257 Further, varia-
tion is also substantial at the appellate level, to which the CJRA
does not apply.25s
The Federal Rules of the 1930s are founded upon judicial
discretion, and now that 645 Article III district judges259 have
lived under that regime, one should not be surprised to find
their exercise of discretion typified by the creation of local varia-
tions, as well as the creation of what some districts call "local,
local rules" or "standing orders"-individual directives from
253. DANIEL R. COQUILLE'lTE & MARy P. SQUIERS, REPORT OF THE LoCAL RULES
PROJECT (1988). See also Subrin, Local Rules, supra note 68, at 137; Paul D.
Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends,
156 F.R.D. 295, 299 (1994). See also Anne M. Burr, Building Reform from the Bot-
tom Up: Formulating Local Rules for Bankruptcy Court-Annexed Mediation, 12 Omo
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 311 (1997); Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, at 1012 (in
which the authors report that, in the 1960s, a "cursory examination of the currently
effective local district court rules reveals a maze of decentralized directives, encum-
bered by trivia and often devoid of explanation"). That 1966 survey (relying on ques-
tionnaires and receiving a fifty percent return) found many variations; for example,
"[d]espite the admonition that a district court afford a modicum of latitude when
determining a temporal allotment for discovery, many districts have imposed rigid
timetables"). Id. at 1044.
254. Subrin, Local Rules, supra note 68, at 2016-18.
255. Id. at 2019.
256. Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, at 1011.
257. Recall that, in 1973, 54 district courts had local rules in contravention of
the national rule on the size of the civil jury, See supra text accompanying note 16.
The Local Rules Survey also reports that, as of the 1960s, several areas of local
rulemaking departed from the national regime, including that despite Rule 16's then
discretionary pretrial process, several local rules required it in all civil cases. Supra
note 94, at 1055,
258. Sisk, supra note 251, at 7-24 (detaiIing the differences among circuit rules),
259. Congressional Quarterly Judiciary Directory 1996, Status of Federal Judge-
ships (as of Oct. 4, 1996) at 669 (645 authorized federal district court judgeships).
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individual judges about how they like cases to be processed
before them. Further, the lack of enthusiasm that RAND found
for differential case management (DCM) is also explained by the
individualization permitted to judges under the Federal Rules.
DCM is a form of very specific local rulemaking about case man-
agement; for that practice to go into effect in a district, judges
must concur on the allocation of kinds of process to kinds of
cases. Interestingly, the FJC's 1996 report on demonstration dis-
tricts discussed the desirability of DCM because it is a source of
uniformity.260 Judicial hesitation in using DCM stems from a
fear of a loss of discretion. In one district, with a small number
of judges, those judges reported that creation of a DCM regime
enabled them to share in a joint process of articulating which
cases fit which rule regimes.261
While the CJRA is yet further ratification of local varia-
tion,262 it is not the creation of such variation, which is itself
deeply interwoven with the system of discretion.263 And if one
doesn't like local variation, one will have to sort out not only
how to pull back from the CJRA but also from the assumptions
that undergird the current rules.264 To the extent rule drafters
have hoped to channel discretion by leaving certain arenas
plainly open to variation (such as the original version of Rule 16
and the current version of Rule 26), the report from RAND re-
minds us that discretion, once authorized, is difficult to cabin.
260. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT, supra note 62, at 15.
261. Id. at 56 (discussing work within the Western District of Michigan).
262. Contrast this reading with that of Lauren Robel, in Fractured Procedure:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994), who argued
that the CJRA should not be read as a broad warrant to depart from national, uni-
form rules and that local rulemaking should be constrained.
263. See also Shapiro, Rule 16, supra note 75, at 1977-78 (discussing the tension
between "flexibility and discretion" and uniformity).
264. Echoes of this view can be found in the judiciary's own evaluation of its
rulemaking process; while recommending inquiry into the use of "opt out" procedures
from national rules and noting that "uniform rules would facilitate a national prac-
tice, this belief should be investigated rather than treated as a shibboleth." A Self-
Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking-A Report from the Subcommittee on Long
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 701 (1995).
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IV. DISCRETIONARY PROCESSES, CONSTRAINED ADJUDICATION:
AGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THIRD
BRANCHES
A Shared Agendas: Procedural Discretion,
Its Amplification, and Its Delegation
to "Judicial Officers"
RAND's interpretation of its finding of relatively little
change stemming from the enactment of the CJRA rests in part
on what it terms the "less than precise wording of most of the
act"265 and its "vague" language.266 The "vague" language is
not happenstance but rather an illuminating facet of the statute.
Here we see agreement between Congress and the judiciary,
sharing a joint project that vests power in judges to make deci-
sions about the shape of litigation. While Congress has, from
time to time, intervened in civil rulemaking,267 in the CJRA of
1990, Congress and the federal judiciary were not genuinely at
odds about how to process civil cases; Congress and the judiciary
were really only disputing who should be announcing that the
mode of civil processing has changed and who might get credit
for a new national rule regime trumpeted as a "reform."268 In
265. RAND's EvALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 33.
266. [d. at 31.
267. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (reducing
the role of U.S. marshals in the service of process in FED. R. CIV. P. 4); Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title vn, Subtitle B, § 7047, 102 Stat.
4181, 4401 (providing that examinations ordered by the court for discovery under
FED. R. CIV. P. 35 include not only physicians but also psychologists); Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (altering FED. R. EvID. 412 to limit admissibility of prior sexual conduct of al-
leged victims). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5381.1 (Supp. 1997). Further, other efforts to have Con-
gress alter discovery and discovery rules have been attempted but not succeeded. See
Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 36, at 994-95. For discussion of congressional
rulemaking on securities and prison litigation, see infra notes 271-273.
268. Note that I am also not arguing that all federal judges embrace the modes
of the CJRA but that the segment supportive of the direction of the CJRA has been
more vocal than the objectors. For such objections, see the Hon. G. Thomas Eisele,
Differing Visions-Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Reformation Model
for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. REv. 1935 (1993) [hereinafter Eisele, Differ-
ing Visions].
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this instance, unlike that of the shrinking size of the civil jury,
Congress did not hesitate to claim itself the reformer of the civil
justice process (the subject of popular criticism debated in presi-
dential and congressional politics about "tort reform"269). The
CJRA and the federal rules together weave a national commit-
ment to trial court discretion.270
Other recent ventures by Congress into rulemaking, specifi-
cally those altering civil practice rules in securities and prisoner
litigation, are also not exemplary of radical variation between
congressional and judicial instinctS.271 Members of the federal
judiciary have been in the forefront of questioning the utility of
both forms of litigation. Federal judges have long crafted doc-
trines and procedures to limit prisoner filings.272 Further, even
Congress' current nibbles at the principle of transsubstantive
civil rules can find precedents crafted by federal judges, who
promulgated special procedures for multi-district litigation,273
for "complex cases,"274 and for prisoners.275
269. See generally Karen O'Connor, Civil Justice Reform and Prospects for
Change, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 917, 919 (1993) (discussing the "rhetoric of crisis" sur-
rounding the courts in the late 1980s and 1990s).
270. Again, this claim is not absolute. Congress did, for example, include the
mandate in the CJRA that public disclosure be given of judges who have cases
pending more than three years. RAND found that, since the disclosure requirement
has been in place, the percentage of cases pending over that time period declined.
RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 24-25. (That finding, like oth-
ers, raises questions of causation; other variables, such as the composition of that
case load and the activities that occur during the three year period, would have to
be assessed to discern the effect of the disclosure requirement.)
271. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321, 66-77 (to be codified at various Titles); Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 et seq.
272. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 69; see also Women Prisoners of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 919 (D.C.
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (reversing a district court's order on
prison conditions for women prisoners, "emphasiz[ingJ that federal courts must move
with caution when called upon to deal with even serious violations of the law by
local prison officials[,J" and remanding for review of whether the Prison Litigation
Reform Act limits the other claims raised by the prisoners).
273. See Patricia D. Howard, Clerk of Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 577 (1977), as revised, 124 F.R.D. 479
(1989) (rules governing procedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
274. MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995).
275. Special Rules for Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, § 2255 (1994) (first
promulgated in 1977); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES
FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS (1980) (committee,
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Another set of agreements between the judiciary and the
Congress is on the need for more judges but the unwillingness to
create more life-tenured judges. While many federal judges be-
speak their commitment to a very small federal judiciary and
argue against adding life-tenured judges,276 federal judges have
in practice been supportive of a three decade expansion program.
that largely depends on the creation of whole other sets of judg-
es who, while not having all the authority of life-tenured judges,
have a lot of their job.
While one might have anticipated that life-tenured judges
would have been fierce guardians of their distinctive mandates,
the pressures of the docket and the desire to alter aspects of
their work has resulted in a series of opinions upholding the
authority of an array ofjudges. Both the Supreme Court and the
Judicial Conference have sanctioned a good deal of delegation of
tasks from life-tenured judges to non-Article III judges,277 some
chaired by the Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, proposed processes for handling "conditions
of confinement" litigation). Thus, congressional efforts to limit prisoner access in the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, are congruent
with some barriers imposed by courts. See, e.g., Marie Cordisco, Pre-PLRA Survey
Reflects Courts' Experiences with Assessing Partial Filing Fees in In Forma Pauperis
Cases, 9 DIRECTIONS 26, 26 (1996) (noting that the general aims of such programs
were congruent with those of Congress in the PLRA, to "discourage frivolous cases
by requiring plaintiffs to consider the costs of their suits"): Hampton v. Hobbs, 106
F.3d 1281, 1285 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding the limitations on prisoner in forma
pauperis filings and noting its past approval of "assessments of costs against indi-
gent prisoners" and of a district court order requiring partial filing fees). But see
Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Iowa, 1996) (finding unconstitutional
aspects of the PLRA that preclude repetitive filings after three previous dismissals
on specified grounds).
For consideration of the relationship between judicial and legislative lawmak-
ing and revision specifically in the context of the PLRA, see Tushnet & Yackle, su-
pra note 69.
276. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal
Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993); see also Gerald B. 'fjoflat, More Judges, Less
Justice, A.BA J., July 1993, at 70. But see Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges,
Too Many Cases, A.BA J., Jan. 1993, at 52.
277. See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). Only occa-
sionally has the Court rejected such delegation, and then in opinions that do not
etch sharp limits. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982); Granfmanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Judicial Conference appreciation of magistrate judges' work comes in many
documents, including its report on the CJRA. See, e.g., 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 20 (in which magistrate judges are recognized as
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of whom are full-time employees within the judicial branch
(magistrate and bankruptcy judges), others (administrative law
judges and hearing officers) in agencies, and yet others are pri-
vately employed but work within courts as "early neutral evalu-
ators,» "mediators,» and "arbitrators."278 Evidence of the expan-
sion of judges comes from a change in nomenclature; no longer
are judges described in many rules and statutes as "district
judges" but rather as "judicial officers,"279 a phrase that spans
a group of similarly-situated government employees authorized
to control the pretrial process and to issue dispositions.280
What do these judicial officers do? Their primary job is to
move cases rapidly and inexpensively through a system.
"indispensable resources . • . readily available to supplement the work of life tenured
district judges in meeting workload demands"). See also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS RECOMMENDATION
65 (1996), approved by the Judicial CQIlference and calling for use of magistrate
judges.
278. The Court has also embraced private arbitration, not only because it pro-
vides an alternative to adjudication but also because it is described as being much
like adjudication. See Resnik, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, supra
note 151; see also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (finding
a Montana statute requiring special notice of arbitration clauses to be preempted);
Painewebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding the question of
arbitrability appropriately determined by the arbitrator). Cf. Prudential Sec., Inc. v.
Mills, 944 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (describing the rule in the Sixth Circuit
as requiring a judicial determination of arbitrability); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 331 (1997).
279. The CJRA defines 'judicial officer" as "a United States district court judge
or a United States magistrate." Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, ch. 23, § 482, codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 471 note (West Supp. 1997). While
earlier drafts had provided for pretrial management by district judges, the Senate's
legislative history explained that, by using the term "judicial officer," Congress au-
thorized a "full role" for magistrate judges in the pre-trial process. See S. REp. No.
101-416, at 63, 1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6852. See also 1997 JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REpORT, supra note 3, which throughout uses the phrase
'judicial officer" ("The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
should consider case management procedures that would encourage judicial officers
to set early trial dates."). Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
The term "judicial officer" appears in the United States Constitution three
times, all in discussions of executive and judicial officers. See U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cI. 3 (discussing oaths to be taken by members of legislatures and "all executive and
judicial Officers"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (twice referring to voting for executive
and judicial officers). In addition, there are more than 150 references in federal
statutes to that phrase.
280. See RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at
244.
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Through national and local rulemaking, through educational
programs, through joint ventures with the bar and Congress,
federal judges have fashioned a position for themselves as "liti-
gation managers," as power brokers, as what Frances McGovern
and I have both argued281 could be termed "players" at the ta-
ble among competing negotiators.282
In addition to successful insulation of discretion in case
processing and in delegating duties, federal judges are also seek-
ing to expand their authority; they may soon return to Congress
with requests for other discretionary charters. For example, the
Honorable Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second Circuit believes
that district judges should have some power to select the cases
they process by means of a discretionary docket; he proposes
that federal judges be authorized to decline cases within certain
categories and send them to state court.283 Also afloat over the
past decade have been several proposals for the end of appeal as
of right.284 The most recent were contemplated by the Long
Range Plan of the United States Judicial Conference, but reject-
ed.285
While appellate oversight remains at a formal level, com-
mentators have begun to document its erosion in practice. Given
that some federal circuits have a system of appeals that decide
281. Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEx. L. REv.
1821, 1839 (1995); Resnik, Procedural Inrwvations, supra note 221, at 1628-31.
282. As Paul Carrington puts it: "The conscious mission of many district judges
is less to make decisions applying law to the facts, and more to preside over the
manufacture of dispositions." Describing an increase in judicial discretion,
Carrington's descriptor is that the "district judge is each year less a judge of a law
court and more a local chancellor or lord of the manor, more to be feared and less
to be respected." Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 943 (footnotes omitted).
283. Jon O. Newman, Determining the Proper Allocation of Cases Between Federal
and State Courts, 79 JUDICATURE 6 (1995) (describing a proposed "discretionary ac-
cess" procedure by which federal judges could "exercise discretion as to whether a
particular case within federal jurisdiction ought to be litigated in federal or state
court").
284. Martha A. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the
Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 45 (outlining some of the proposals); Judith
Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605-24 (1985) (discussing Chief
Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the time may have come to consider abolishing
appeal as of right in the federal system).
285. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 43-44 (Dec. 1995) ("[t]o ensure the continued fairness and quality
of federal justice, the principle of allowing litigants at least one appeal as of right to
an Article m forum should be upheld~).
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many cases without oral argument and without publication of
opinions, Professor Lauren Robel argues that a kind of discre-
tionary appellate system may well have begun.286 Professors
William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds add that such
discretion has resulted in a tracking system, in which "impor-
tant cases" receive more attention.287 Within a bit more than a
century, we may be about to come full circle, from a system
before the Evarts Act of 1891 that did not provide appeal as of
right in every case to such a system once again.286 Here may
be another example of practice that predates formal revisions; in
practice, judges have installed a system of discretionary review,
and its statutory ratification may not be too far in the distance.
B. The Purposes ofDiscretionary Processing
and the Powers ofJudicial Officers
What do we know about the results of the transformation of
the role of judge? RAND's work powerfully questions the utility
of the general trajectory over the decades of reform of the civil
286. Lauren Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 898-
906 (1993) (discussing how arguments and publication of opinions are optional with
the appellate court and that, in the subset of cases that are neither argued or pub-
lished, "judges' involvement . . . is marginal"). See also Dragich, supra note 284, at
12-14.
287. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273,
275, 293 (1996) (terming the appellate courts "the new certiorari courts," and argu-
ing that "important" is often defined by "monetary value" and that "powerful liti-
gants" receive more attention whereas smaller value cases, such as social security
appeals, are often handled primarily by staff and receive little judicial time). See
also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264 (1996) (agreeing with much of the description but dis-
agreeing about the role played by federal judges in framing the revised appellate
system and questioning the proposed responses); William L. Reynolds & William M.
Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996)
(responding that federal judges who lobby against expansion of the judiciary and
who make policies about oral argument and delegation of decisionmaking have
played a key role in framing a new appellate tiered process and that the expansion
of the appellate courts is needed to restore judicial review in all cases).
288. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1028-30 (1984) (discussing the
evolution of Supreme Court doctrine reducing appellate oversight in a variety of
contexts); Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 934-35 (discussing the Evarts
Act of 1891 and its goal of curbing what federal legislators then termed the "kingly
power" of unsupervised federal judges).
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process. The report tells us that some rules and practices of
management aimed at cost reduction are not well designed for
the purpose, that they do not in fact reduce costS.289 RAND
teaches us that, to go after cost and time, judges would have to
limit (not manage) discovery and shorten the interval to trial.
The disturbing core of RAND's conclusion is that, if the goals of
the civil process are speed and cost reduction, the way to achieve
them is to "1) monitor cases to ensure that deadlines for service
and answer are met; 2) wait a short period after the joinder date
before beginning judicial case management to see if a case will
terminate; 3) set a firm trial date early; and 4) set a reasonably
short discovery cutoff time."290 In short, were "judicial officers"
to adopt the posture of calendar clerks, imposing and enforcing
time limits on disputants, the goals of speedy, inexpensive dispo-
sitions might be achieved.
These developments are, in my view, significant; instead of
being distracted by debates focused on disagreements between
the judiciary and Congress over civil processes, our interest
should be centered on federal judges' commitment to their own
discretion over civil processes, the melange and trajectory ofjobs
now termed "judicial," and the relationship of that work to the
role ofjudges as adjudicators.
One set of concerns implicates the general issue of rules and
standards, and in this specific context, revolves around long-
standing questions of visibility, accountability, and supervi-
sion.291 As Stephen Subrin,292 Stephen Yeazell,293 Paul
Carrington,294 and 1295 have elsewhere observed, these past
289. Given these findings, one might then search for other justifications for the
case management regime. For example, one might try to justify case management as
an effort to require attorney investment of time and resources to make for better
dispositions, and then seek research to learn about whether dispositions are affected
by such techniques and try to figure out what measures of quality are possible.
290. This summary comes from the 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S CJRA REpORT,
supra note 3, at 16. The Judicial Conference then stated its endorsement of "short-
ened discovery cutoffs and a fixed trial date" as a part of its interpretation of the
report as supporting judicial management as long as it is coupled with time limits.
[d.
291. See Resnik, Tiers, supra note 288, at 990-94.
292. Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41.
293. Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 73.
294. Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37.
295. Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 188.
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decades have witnessed the expansion of federal trial court dis-
cretion-of which RAND's report provides important further
proof. From a variety of intertwined sources (expansion of equity
practice, promulgation of the 1938 rules, and celebration of man-
agerial judges) comes the same bottom line: relatively little
superintendence of the trial court by appellate judges.
In addition to the age-old question of how to oversee the
exercise of discretion, another concern, yet more fundamental,
should engage us: at issue are the purposes to which that discre-
tion is attached. Federal trial judges have, over this century,
achieved a roving commission, but to do what? Federal district
judges believe in, are protective of, and have been successful on
the civil side in persuading others, and specifically Congress, to
let them keep a vast amount of discretion in the handling and
processing of the civil case load: including discretion to pick the
numbers of jurors to listen to a civil case; discretionary proce-
dures to process "protracted" cases; discretionary procedures to
manage ordinary civil cases; discretion to try to manage lawyers;
discretionary affiliations with national rule regimes; and now,
proposed discretionary appellate review and proposed discretion
to determine which cases to admit to federal courts.296 Federal
judges have also agreed to become part of a cadre of judicial
officers, and further, have conferred some of their discretionary
authority on others both in and outside of the judicial branch.
While the breadth of powers of a federal district court judge
over the civil docket is thus exposed, with support for it coming
from both the judiciary and Congress, the purposes for which
the exercise of these discretionary powers are put is much hard-
er to "sight" (as in see) and to "cite" (as in quote from au-
thoritative sources). While the district judge is a looming figure
in contemporary processes, judicial attributes-other than pow-
erful discretion-remain sketchy. Where is the vision for the
judge? the sense of purpose? the ends served by the discretion-
ary powers conferred? If the dominant agenda of the life-tenured
296. Of course, it would be a disservice to describe the actual rulemaking-both
judicial and statutory-as singular in focus and only expanding judicial authority.
Amendments to rules such as Rule 16 have not only increased discretion but have
also included mandates, obliging judges to engage in certain forms of pretrial super-
intendence. But my point is about judicial views of the desirability of broad discre-
tion, not its invariable actualization.
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trial judiciary is to manage, settle, and dispose of litigation and
further, if its work is readily transferrable to other, non-tenured
members of the judicial workforce, and in addition done as well
by private providers (whom some litigants seem to prefer to the
judiciary), it is difficult to argue about the distinctive import of
the federal courts, let alone for special funding and prerogatives
of this purportedly unique national resource.297
Of course, the response to such concerns is insistently to
note that only federal judges can adjudicate, and moreover, that
some of that adjudication demands the participation of an Arti-
cle III judge.29B But, while academics have made arguments in
recent years about the necessity of Article III judges at some
point in the federal adjudicatory process,299 the literature by
trial judges on their work as adjudicators is notably thin.3OO
Federal judges have told us no story over these last decades to
sustain the peculiar and particular form of decisionmaking,
public adjudication, that is their domain exclusively.3Dl In-
297. See William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 24 THE TmRD BRANCH 1 (1992) (discussing the need to reserve feder-
al judicial resources for issues "where important national interests predominate").
298. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 950-74 (1988).
299. Comments from a group of law professors (of whom I am one) have raised
concerns that judges decreasingly share what Paul Carrington calls a "collective
sense that the enforcement of legal rights and duties is their primary business."
Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 938. See also Subrin, Uniformity in Pro-
cedural Rules, supra note 250; Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural
Change: Who, How, Why, and When, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221 (1997); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note
188, at 423-32.
300. One brief essay comes from the Hon. William R. Wilson, Jr., of the Eastern
District of Arkansas, who wrote in, Where Has All the Civility Gone?, ARKANSAS
TRIAL LAWYER MAGAZINE, Summer, 1990 at 5, in which he notes that "The word
judge is a verb as well as a noun and adjective." See also Eisele, Differing Visions,
supra note 268 (protesting proposals for increased use of tracking and ADR and
commenting that, were those suggestions successful, "the federal judicial power in
most civil cases would be delegated out, or sub-contracted, to non-judges and in
some cases to non-lawyers").
301. See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in De-
cline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986). Paul Carrington makes a parallel point, de-
scribing the changes as a decline in 'judicial professionalism" and includes as one of
the factors that contribute to it the "growing preoccupation of district judges with
administration, as distinct from enforcement, or, in other words, with moving cases
rather than deciding them." Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 940-14.
While a few judges have vocally protested, see, e.g., Eisele, Differing Visions,
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stead, judicial leaders have transformed the practices of judging
and shifted the center to the pretrial phase, during which they
offer advice and make informal decisions.302
Having just read three lengthy volumes about civil processes
in the United States federal courts in the 1990s, and having
read much of the literature about the need for and changes in
civil processes, I can report almost no discussion of adjudication.
The lengthy descriptions of RAND's intense study of the last
four years of civil processes provide little insight into the judicia-
ry as a unique and precious institution to preserve. Moreover,
not only is little attention paid to the work of deciding disputed
issues, but also missing from the conversation are words we
might have aspired to include, when judges and civil procedure
are the focus: judgment, wisdom, fairness, the difficult, angst-
ridden problem of rendering judgment, the distinctive role of the
deliberative judge.
In the early 1980s, Judge Patrick Higginbotham noted the
trend toward proliferation of judges and worried about the "con-
version of hearing examiners to judges, commissioners to magis-
trates, and referees in bankruptcy to judges."303 Today's worry
may well be the reverse: the conversion of judges into referees.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently explained that a court-appointed mediator enjoyed judi-
cial immunity from suit because there was nothing different
between what the mediator did and what a "judge might ...
have" done.304 While one can marvel at the creation of all these
supra note 268, as noted above, the judges who run institutions such as the Federal
Judicial Center have been some of the most prominent promoters of a manageri-
al/settlement regime.
302. Recall that Wayne Brazil reports that lawyers like judicial involvement in
settlement when judges make decisions, assessing the value of cases. See supra note
173.
303. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judi-
ciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 264 (1980) (arguing that while all these groups were
doing a good job in their assigned roles, it was unwise to delegate the judicial task).
He accurately predicted that this group would "grow not just in number, but in
function and power." Id. at 269.
304. Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1004 (1995). See also Austem v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990) (commercial organizations sponsoring con-
tractual arbitration are immune from civil liability); Corey v. New York Stock Exch.,
691 F.2d 1205, 1209-11 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that, because of the "functional
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"judicial officers" and the delegation of work to them as an inno-
vative response to the longstanding need for more judges and
the political limitations on enlargement of the life-tenured judi-
ciary, the transition of the entire workforce of judges into "judi-
cial officers" makes it difficult to explain why some of them
should continue to have either life-tenure or awesome authority,
much of it discretionary.
c. Real Conflicts: The Power to Adjudicate
Why worry about diminished rationales for special powers to
reside in a life-tenured judiciary? Because despite the agree-
ments on civil processing, Congress and the judiciary are not
easy co-venturers on fundamental questions ofjudicial authority
to adjudicate. The troubling conflicts between the federal judi-
ciary and Congress are not about how the judiciary moves the
civil docket but about how the judiciary decides cases and how it
functions as a branch of government. At issue is the exercise of
power over outcomes (such as the judiciary's authority to judge
cases involving the environment,305 securities regulation,306
habeas COrpUS,307 and prisons306) and its authority to govern
itself. Over the last few years, these conflicts have become vivid.
For example, many proposals described as "court stripping"
(depriving the federal courts ofjurisdiction over particular kinds
comparability of the arbitrators' decision-making process and judgments to those of
judges and agency hearing examiners[,]" the New York Stock Exchange, when acting
through its arbitrators, has quasi-judicial immunity also shared by its arbitrators).
305. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (finding that legis-
lation directing the "management of areas . . . in Oregon and Washington" and
stating that agreements about the spotted owls were "adequate . . . for the purpose
of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for" then pending litigation,
specified by name in the statute, had not impermissibly ordered an outcome in law-
suits but rather had changed the law involving logging and preservation of animal
habitats). [d. at 434-35.
306. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995) (congressional re-
quirements that courts reopen cases dismissed as time-barred).
307. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (determining that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not repeal the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction over habeas corpus and that the restrictions do not constitute a
'suspension' of the writ"). [d. at 2340.
308. See the Prison Litigation Reform Act, discussed supra note 267 and infra
notes 310-315.
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of cases, such as those involving abortion rights or school
prayer) have been advanced over the past several decades but,
until recently, they have not passed.S09 But, given recent legis-
lation, the once "academic" exercise that federal courts teachers
engaged in, of exploring whether such legislation could be consti-
tutional, is now no longer hypothetical.
Some of the statutes limit judicial review, while others cre-
ate rules for remedies and alter remedies and decisions already
in place. For example, in 1996, Congress restricted judicial re-
view of deportation orders and of asylum denials.slD In addi-
tion, Congress has mandated sentences for certain kinds of of-
fenses and, more generally, ordered judges to rely on sentencing
guidelines created by a congressionally-charted commission.sll
With the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
Congress comes close to dictating how to decide certain catego-
ries of claims; litigation about that act centers around the consti-
tutionality of provisions of the PLRA about termination of con-
sent decreess12 and automatic stays of injunctions.SlS Pending
309. See generally Larry G. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981). Cf. John Harrison, The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U.
Cm. L. REV. 203 (1997).
310. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-79, § 440 (1996), (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West
Supp. 1997»; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 607-12 § 306, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231
(1996» ("no court may enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief in any
action pertaining to an order to exclude an alien •.." or certify class actions in
litigation except via limited habeas proceedings, also circumscribed), 699
(§ 604(bX2)(D), amending 8 U.S.C. 1158) (West Supp. 1997). Thus far, several courts
have upheld various of these provisions, in part by noting that other avenues of
judicial review may be open. See, e.g., Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir.
1997) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an effort to obtain review of the fmal order
of deportation and concluding that the constitutional issue-of "whether the Constitu-
tion requires independent judicial review of a deportation order where a question of
law is raised" - can be avoided because of the availability of review through habeas
jurisdiction); Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
§ 440(a)'s language is "not so broad as to preclude judicial review of claims brought
pursuant to other statutes"). See also Auguste v. Attorney Gen., 118 F.3d 723 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("because the Constitution does not give aliens the right to judicial review
of deportation orders," § 1252 is constitutional).
311. Symposium, Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1992); Dennis E.
Curtis, Mistretta and Metaphor, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 607 (1992).
312. See, e.g., Taylor v. Arizona, 972 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding un-
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are yet other efforts to limit judicial authority to approve con-
sent decrees that involve the expenditure of public funds.314
Congress also intervened directly in a particular case involving
criminal proceedings against defendants charged with bombing a
federal building in Oklahoma. Congress overruled the district
judge's decision on televised proceedings and on the attendance
of witnesses.315
constitutional as a violation of separations of powers the PLRA provisions requiring
tennination of consent decrees entered before the statute's enactment). A similar
holding from a district court in Iowa (Gavin v. Ray, 1996 WL 622556 (S.D. Iowa.
1996» was reversed by the Eighth Circuit in Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081,
1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Congress may alter remedial powers of federal
courts and prevent them from enforcing "equitable relief previously awarded in pend-
ing cases" and that the immediate tennination provisions of the PLRA "do not
amount to an attempt by Congress to reopen final judgments of Article ill courts");
Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 928, Docket 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896 (2d Cir. 1997)
(reversing a district court for vacating a consent decree under PLRA; noting that
plaintiffs may seek enforcement of non-federal aspects of consent decrees in state
courts based on an interpretation that the PRLA.'s requirement of "tennination of
prospective relief' means that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce such
decrees but not that the decrees themselves are invalid); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d
365, 369-70, 374 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the termination provisions, as construed
to avoid constitutional questions, and noting Congress' "legitimate interest in . . .
protecting states from overzealous supervision by the federal courts in the area of
prison . . • litigation"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997).
313. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (eX2) and Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1366
<W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding automatic stay provisions unconstitutional because they
are akin to making decisions in cases without individual detenninations and
factfinding). Further, the PLRA instructs judges about the requisite findings to be
made and limits their otherwise expansive settlement authority and powers to ap-
point special masters. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (aXc) (providing that no consent decrees
may be entered without findings that the relief is "narrowly drawn, extends no fur-
ther than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right"); id. at
§ 3626 (0 (specifying procedures for special master appointments, interlocutory ap-
peals of such appointments, and limiting the authority of masters and their compen-
sation).
314. See the Judicial Refonn Act of 1997, H.R. 1252, 105th Congo § 1369, "Limi-
tations on Federal Court Remedies" (1997) (requiring that no district court enter
orders or approve settlements requiring states or their political subdivisions to "im-
pose, increase, levy, or assess any tax for the purpose of enforcing any Federal or
State . . . right or law" without findings, based on "clear and convincing evidence" of
many factors, including no alternatives, no loss of property values; authorizing in-
tervention by any "aggrieved corporation, or unincorporated association" or others in
such proceedings; and requiring automatic tennination provisions).
315. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 235 (requiring courts to order closed circuit televised proceedings to enable
persons to view proceedings that become distant because of a change in venue);
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Yet other illustrations of conflicts between Congress and the
judiciary come from ongoing battles about the configuration of
courts, the salaries of judges, and the confirmation of nominees.
In the last several months, members of Congress have attempt-
ed, over the objections of most of the judges of the court and its
lawyers, to split the Ninth Circuit.316 In 1995, members of Con-
gress sought to halt ongoing studies sponsored by several of the
circuits on gender, racial, and ethnic fairness.317 Another arena
of conflict is congressional processing of judicial ap-
pointments318 and congressional control over judicial pay.319
In addition, federal judges have objected to what some term
"micro-management" of the federal judiciary, including the re-
ceipt of a questionnaire, from the chair of a Senate subcommit-
tee, about how federal judges use their time and what they do in
their extra-judicial activities.320 Commentators report on an
Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-06 (prohibiting a district
judge from ordering a victim of an offense excluded from the trial because of a pos-
sible subsequent need to testify at sentencing); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Victim Power,
THE NEW YORKER 40, 42 (Mar. 24, 1997) (describing the victims of the bombing as
"going over the judge's head and getting [an] act of Congress").
316. Senate Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriation Bill of 1998, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1997, S. 1022, 105th Cong., § 305 (1997). See generally Carl Tobias, Why
Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REv. 583 (1997).
317. 141 CONGo REc. S14,691-92 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (three Republican
senators criticizing the efforts and urging federal funds be withdrawn). A rebuttal
can be found at 141 CONGo REC. S18,127-05 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (nine Democrat-
ic senators voiced support for the efforts).
318. According to the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as of Sep-
tember I, 1997, "103 vacancies, or 12% of the 837 positions among the federal ap-
pellate and trial courts, and 52 nominations are awaiting Senate action." Statement
of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law on Vacancies in the Federal
Judiciary (Sept. 1997) (on file with author). In 1994, the University of Virginia es-
tablished the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges; its work
was prompted by concern about delays in filling judgeships. See Statement of Daniel
J. Meador before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on behalf of the ABA
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, FED. NEWS SERVo (May 21, 1996).
319. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Criticizes Congress on Raises, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 1, 1997, at A14 (reporting on his annual state of the judiciary address as warn·
ing that the "morale and quality of the federal judiciary" was at stake). The speech,
1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, is reprinted at 29 THE THIRD
BRANCH 1 (Jan. 1997). According to a recent ABA report, AN INDEPENDENT JUDI-
CIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE [hereinafter AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY] 28-29 (ABA, 1997), Congress
has neither raised judicial salaries since 1993 nor provided cost-of-living increases.
320. AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 319, at 31-32.
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increased acrimony in the interactions between judges and attor-
neys; as Professor Charles Geyh puts it: "As the judiciary's pro-
file in the legislative process has risen, so too have attacks on
the judiciary's credibility."321
Most recently, individual federal and state judges have
found themselves the brunt of sustained personal attacks,
launched either in an attempt to have them removed from office
or intimated in the discharge of their duties while in office.322
In 1996, the ABA created a special "Commission on the Separa-
tion of Powers and Judicial Independence" to respond to attacks
on the judiciary;323 its report, issued in July of 1997, concluded
that a "new cycle of intense judicial scrutiny and criticism is
now upon US"324 and objected to what it termed "demagogic at-
tacks."325 While noting that United States' history has had
other such cycles and that the judiciary has itself not always
been restrained in its responses, the ABA described new aspects
to the debate, including congressional interest "in the internal
management and operational efficiencies of the judiciary" and
the "unfortunate shrillness" that has marked the "tenor of inter-
branch discussions."326 The Commission reported on "mounting
evidence not only of a loss of confidence and respect but also a
diminished understanding of the role of judges and an indepen-
321. Geyh, supra note 200, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1207.
322. Some of these incidents are catalogued in AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra
note 319, at 15-19. See also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary:
Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimate and Remove Judges from Office for
Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309 (1997); Judicial Independence, 80 JUDI-
CATURE 155-183 (1997) (discussing attacks on individual judges, including those on
Penny White, who lost a retention election for her seat on the Supreme Court of
Tennessee and on Rosemary Barkett, formerly of the Florida Supreme Court and
now sitting on the Eleventh Circuit); Katharine Q. Seelye, House G.O.P. Begins List-
ing a Few Judges to Impeach, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1997, at A24; David Barton,
Impeachment! Restraining an Overactive Judiciary (on file with author) (a memoran-
dum circulated in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1997 and offering arguments
from the "founders" on why impeachment is appropriate; further, arguing that
"[elven if it seems that an impeachment conviction against a certain official is un-
likely, impeachment should nevertheless be pursued. Why? Because just the process
of impeachment serves as a deterrent."). Id. at 53.
323. Henry J. Reske, Where to Draw the Line: ABA Commission Defines Areas of
Judicial Independence, 82 A.BA J. 99 (1996).
324. AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 319, at i.
325. Id. at 46.
326. Id. at ii.
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dent judiciary in protecting and enforcing the rights of the peo-
ple."327 The American Judicature Society has launched a spe-
cial project on judicial independence; its goal is to "promote and
safeguard the principle ofjudicial independence."328
Consider this series of incursions on the legitimacy and
authority of judges against the background of the federal
judiciary's success in rewording the CJRA to confirm its discre-
tionary powers over civil case processing. That juxtaposition
provides reason to wonder about the wisdom of the transforma-
tion of judicial practices. Decades of judges as managers, negoti-
ators, super-senior partners, and settlement mediators do not
equip them well for such conflict. While powerfully imbued with
discretion over how to process cases, federal judges seem all too
vulnerable to oversight in the exercise of their judgment. It is
not that the judiciary's adoption of a managerial stance towards
its work has caused these battles but rather that, by turning the
role of the judge into that of a bureaucratic manager, by explain-
ing that the judge's job is just like that of a mediator,329 by
permitting ever-increasing delegation of the judicial task,330 by
becoming individual case tailors, the federal judiciary has not
provided much argument for its special charter or why its consti-
tutional role is worth cherishing. When the federal judiciary
shifts its focus from adjudication and its consequential remedial
authority, it loses a key identifying element of what constitutes
a judge, and hence it loses reasons for protesting against con-
gressional intervention.
Moreover, the charter of discretionary powers over civil
pretrial processing rests on the special role of the judge, the
unique vantage point, not only of disinterest but also of knowl-
edge and experience of what adjudication offers in contrast to
other forms of disposition.33l If judges have altered the practice
of judging and made it a kind of manager-facilitator job that
327. Id. at vii.
328. Interview with Sandra Ratcliff Daffron, Independent Judiciary is Key Issue
for MS, 29 THIRD BRANCH 10-11 (Aug. 1997).
329. Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d at 1249.
330. See generally, Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (1985).
331. See BRAZIL, SET1'LING CMt DISPUTES, supra note 173, arguing that it is
judges' training at decisionmaking that makes them effective at bringing about set-
tlements.
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many officials of courts and private parties can do, why give
them either substantial discretion in pretrial processing or in
adjudication? At issue is the role of the judge, the practice of
judging, and the reason for celebrating or limiting the work of
the Third Branch.
Hence, I close with a comment made in 1956 by Harry
Nims, a lawyer-proponent of pre-trial processes:
Pre-trial may have changed our concept of the function of our
judges. Perhaps they are to be no longer regarded only as impar-
tial moderators or umpires in courtroom duels; but in addition, as
wise, understanding friends of those who seek relief in courts,
ready to help with their common sense, wisdom and their knowl-
edge of the law and of human nature, to adjust differences quick-
ly and with just as little expenditure in time and money as is
possible.332
He concluded his comments by stating: "Surely this is an end
greatly to be desired."333
That enthusiasm is what I cannot share.
332. Nims, Some By-Products of Pretrial, supra note 89, at 191. Nims also
authored a book, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, published under the co-sponsorship of
the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States and the Council of the Section on Judicial Administration of the ABA.
333. Nims, Some By-Products of Pretrial, supra note 89, at 191.
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